2018-07-14
1693 
【摘要】在谷物钢材等货物运输中，因货物性质及贵重等原因，在卸港经常碰到货损货差方面的问题。那么承租人在这种情况下，是否可以从运费中直接扣除此索赔？本文通过The“Brede”一案的分析来说明这一问题。
【关键词】货损货差、抵扣、索赔、运费
在航运实务中，经常碰到有货损货差等索赔，尤其是在粮食和钢材等货物运输中。一方面因为货物本身的性质，另一方面也因为货值较高。以谷物为例，如装港在阿根廷，经常发生船方数据比岸方的少，这种情况下，在卸货港就很容易出现货物短少；同时如果货物含水量较高，或者货舱水密有问题或通风不当，在航程较长的航次，在卸货港往往容易发生货损问题。而钢材，较容易出现生锈，在清洁提单下，在卸货港也经常遭遇收货人索赔。
在这些发生货损货差的情况，可能收货人会要求船东提供担保，要不就不放船；也有的租家可能从运费尾款中直接抵扣此部分索赔。与租金不同的是，承租人是否可以从运费中直接抵扣这类货损货差索赔呢？本文通过The“Brede”一案的分析来说说这方面的问题。
一、基本案情
挪威的公司Henriksens Rederi A/S（以下简称“船东”）在1964年1月将Brede轮（以下简称“该轮”）租给波兰的公司T.H.Z.Rolimpex（以下简称“租家”），合同以金康格式，执行一个从缅甸的仰光运送大米到波兰的格丁尼亚航次，运费为每长吨110美元。
根据租船合同，该轮前往缅甸的仰光，装载8,588长吨的大米。提单签发的日期为1964年2月10日和15日，总运费为43,667英镑。在1964年2月20日，租家支付了80％。的运费，金额为35,427英镑。
1964年3月，该轮抵达格丁尼亚并卸下货物。租家抱怨说，有些大米在航行期间丢失了，而且其中有一些已经损坏。1964年5月11日，租家支付了4,936英镑额外的运费，但由于短货及货损等问题，因此扣留了约3,000英镑。1964年5月13日，船东对此做法表示抗议，不同意租家作扣减。船东要求租家应该全额支付运费，指出租家应该向船东的保赔协会提出损害赔偿要求，保赔协会将对此索赔金额负责。
然而，租家拒绝全额支付运费，他们委托了粮食检验员对货物进行鉴定。他检验员检验后，报告称在航行中丢失了19长吨大米，并且30多吨大米因受潮而损坏：这是由于船舶因不适航而导致海水进入船舱所致。然后租家拿出确切的数字，声称扣除约2,529英镑，因货物短缺及损坏。最终，租家支付了约830英镑运费余额给船东。
船东告诉租家他们应该全额支付运费，声称船东在伦敦的保赔协会准备就租家的货物损坏索赔提供担保，但收货人拒绝了船东此提议。收人货人表示，他们认为接受保赔协会的担保而不是扣留运费是不合理的。船东答复说，货物损坏是一件保险事宜，船东要求全额支付运费，并重申愿意为损失提供协会担保。
随后发现货主对货物有保险，货物的保险人最初向租家支付了约2,529英镑，因货物损坏，但租家将其偿还给承保人，然后将其从运费中扣留。所以，到1964年7月，双方已经划清界限。一方面，船东表示应该全额支付运费而不扣除任何货物损坏费用，并且对这种损害的索赔应在另外一项对他们的交叉诉讼中作出决定：并且船东的保赔协会将保证支付款项。另一方面，货主说他们有权从运费中扣除他们的索赔，并且没有义务再支付任何运费。
因此之后两年都没有做任何事情，船东没有指定仲裁员来确定有争议的运费索赔。租家也没有任命仲裁员来确定有争议的货物损坏索赔。租家希望并相信船东已决定不追求运费索赔：但是，船东这样做，他们抓住了机会。租家面临着严重的风险，因为船东有6年的时间追索运费，但租家只有一年的时间来追索货物短缺和损坏的索赔。
合同的相关条款如下，其中运费支付付款条款规定：80%的运费在提单签发后7天内支付，不可退不管货物是否丢失，而尾款在准确及真实交付后17天内支付。
The freightto be paid in transferable Pounds Sterling in London to Hambros Bank Ltd.,London, for account of Henriksens Rederi A/S, Oslo, as follows:- 80% within 7days of signing BS/L non-returnable ship and/or cargo lost or not lost and the balance within 17 days of right and true delivery.
仲裁条款规定，根据本租船合同或根据本租船合同签发的任何提单而产生的任何争议，均应在伦敦提交仲裁。
Any disputearising under this charter party or out of any Bills of Lading issued underthis charter party shall be referred to arbitration in London.
提单并入了《海牙规则》：
The Owners' liability under this charter party shall be governed by the terms of the HagueRules contained in the International Convention for the unification of certainrules relating to Bills of Lading, dated Brussels, 25th August, 1924.
《海牙规则》第3条第6款规定如下，除非从货物交付之日或应交付之日起一年内提出诉讼，承运人和船舶在任何情况下都免除对灭失或损害所负的一切责任。
.. . In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from allliability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one yearafter delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have beendelivered.
二、争议焦点
船东在时效上利用了这一差异。经过两年后，1966年1月，船东再次提出了他们的运费主张，这显然是在6年的允许时间内。他们任命Clyde先生为他们的仲裁员。租家任命Chesterman先生为他们的仲裁员。在回答船东的运费索赔时，租家就损毁货物提出了索赔主张。船东在答复中表示，船东他们已经免除了所有责任，因为租家没有在货物交付后的一年内提出此货物索赔。
当事人双方的仲裁员互不同意，因此任命Rokison先生为首席仲裁员，对他们双方之间作出裁定。他认为，船东的运费主张得到了成功：但仅限于实际交付货物的运费。他还认为，“海牙规则”规定，租家的货物短缺索赔期限为一年。因此，船东对运费的主张（有六年时间限制）成功了，但租家对货物损坏的索赔（一年时间限制）不成立。首席仲裁员陈述了一个法院意见。
商事法院Mocatta法官认为很明显，“海牙规则”规定了货物索赔的一年的时效期限。“海牙规则”第6条适用于反诉，如果交叉诉讼被驳回作为抵消，那么就没有理由使得一种单纯的抗辩手段能够规避诉讼时效，而抵消是已过时效。如果将辩护理由视为真正的辩护理由，则承租人对货物的损坏提出抗辩无法对抗出租人为支付运费的诉讼。Mocatta法官支持了仲裁员的这一裁决，租家不服裁决，提出上诉。
三、法官判决
对于时效限制的法律问题，Denning勋爵认为，就时间的流逝而言，仲裁与法律上的行为一样受到类似的规则约束：但进行了必要的修改。当诉讼令状发出时，即视为已开始诉讼。如果一方当事人给另一方发通知说指定一名仲裁员，则视为仲裁开始。
So far asthe running of time is concerned, arbitrations are subject to similar rules asactions at law: but with this necessary modification. An action is deemed to be commenced at the time when the writ is issued. An arbitration is deemed to be commenced when one party serves on the other a notice to appoint an arbitrator, see sect.27 of the Limitation Act, 1939.
Denning勋爵认为从原则上讲，在适用限制性法律时，必须区分辩护性质和交叉诉讼性质的问题。当被告被起诉时，他可以提出任何适当的辩护性质的事情，而不必担心会受到一段时间的限制。没有任何辩护，恰如其分地受到时效限制。但被告不能提出适当交叉诉讼主题的事项，除非在这样的索赔期限内。交叉诉讼可以单独作出，也可以通过抵消或反索赔的方式作出。但原则上它总是受时效限制。被告所允许的期限取决于他为执行其交叉诉讼所采取的步骤。如果他通过单独的诉讼或仲裁提起诉讼，他必须在规定的时间内开始诉讼，否则他将被禁止。如果他以抵偿或反诉的方式将其作为“索赔”提起，则法律受937年“限制法”第28节规定管辖：就本法而言，通过抵消或反诉的任何请求应被视为单独的行为，并且在与抵销或反诉所采取的诉讼相同的日期开始。
In point of principle, when applying the law of limitation, a distinction must be drawn between a matter which is in the nature of a defence and one which is in the nature of a cross-claim. When a defendant is sued, he can raise any matterwhich is properly in the nature of a defence, without fear of being met by aperiod of limitation. No defence, properly so called, is subject to a time bar.But the defendant cannot raise a matter which is properly the subject of across-claim, except within the period of limitation allowed for such a claim. Across-claim may be made in a separate action, or it may be made by way of set-off or counterclaim. But on principle it is always subject to a time bar.The period allowable to the defendant depends on the steps which he takes toenforce his cross-claim. If he brings it by a separate action or arbitration,he must start his proceedings within the prescribed time or else he will bebarred. If he raises it as a "claim" by way of set-off orcounterclaim the law is governed by sect. 28 of the Limitation Act, 1937, whichsays:
For the purposes of this Act, any claim by way of set-off or counterclaim shall bedeemed to be a separate action and to have been commenced on the same date asthe action in which the set-off or counterclaim is pleaded.
Denning勋爵认为“set-off”在第28节这个部分没有定义，认为这是用来表示法定抵消而不是衡平抵销。这就是法定抵销所允许的合法抵销。这些规定只适用于“当双方的债权是在债权恳求时可以确定地确定的债务清偿或金钱主张”时，这些交叉诉讼必须由单独的交易产生。在Halsbury第三版中，关于抵销的权利说到；在减少或消减原告的诉讼请求时，有权申请由原告提起的债务（由单独交易产生）。
The word "set-off" is not defined in this sect. 28: but I think it is used to denote a legal set-off and not an equitable set-off. That is, a legal set-off as permitted by the statutes of set-off. These apply only "when the claims on both sides are liquidated debts or money demands which can be ascertained with certainty at the time of pleading", see Bullen and Leake, 3rd ed. p. 679. Thesecross-claims must arise out of separate transactions. It is so stated in Halsbury 3rd ed., vol. 34 at p. 396. It there says that the right of set-offis:
. . . the right to plead a debt due from the plaintiff, arising from a separate transaction, in reduction or extinction of the plaintiff's claim . .
Denning勋爵认为需注意编辑们在这里强调的是单独的交易。如果没有单独的交易，但只有同一交易产生的反对主张，那么不会出现所谓的抵消问题。编辑们在同一页面的注释中说：当反对的主张被连接时，通过在同一交易中产生的尾款一直被普通法视为债务，因此不会出现抵消问题。对于这个观点，他们引用Mansfield勋爵在Green v. Farmer, (1768)案中所说：如果就业，交易或交易的性质必然构成一个由收支，债务和信用组成的账户：肯定只有尾款可以是债务。
Note the emphasis which the editors put on there being separate transactions. If thereis no separate transaction, but only opposing demands arising out of the sametransaction, then no question of set-off, properly so-called, arises. The editors say in a note on the same page:
When opposing demands are connected, by originating in the same transaction the balance has always been regarded by the common law as the debt, so that noquestion of set-off arises . . .
For this proposition they cite Lord Mansfield in Green v. Farmer, (1768) 4 Burr. 2214,when he said (at p. 2221):
Where the nature of the employment, transaction or dealings, necessarily constitutes an account consisting of receipts and payments, debts and credits: it is certainthat only the balance can be the debt.
Denning勋爵认为，“反诉”一词在第28节中没有被定义，他认为这是：“任何可能成为独立行为主体的主张，不仅限于金钱主张，并且它不需要与原始主体相关或与其相关，或者事情。”Denning勋爵认为这就是“抵销”和“反诉”的含义。
Denning勋爵认为如果原告欠被告单独交易产生的债务，被告可以通过抵消方式提出。如果在原告发布他的诉讼令状的日期受到时效限制，那么时效限制仍然存在。但是，如果在原告发出令状时没有时效限制，被告可以提出反对原告主张的请求，而不受任何干预时效的影响。这是在Walkerv. Clements, (1850) 25 Q.B. 1046案，其赋予了第28节法定效力。在这种情况下，正如每一次法定抵销一样，债务是由单独的交易产生的。
Where the plaintiff owes the defendant a debt arising from a separate transaction, the defendant can raise it by way of set-off. If it is time barred at the date when the plaintiff issues his writ, it is time barred still. But if it is not time barred at the time when the plaintiff issues his writ, the defendant can raise it in opposition to the plaintiff's claim without being affected by any intervening running of time. That was decided in Walker v. Clements, (1850) 25 Q.B. 1046 which is given statutory effect by sect. 28. In that case, as in every legal set-off,the debts arose out of separate transactions.
Denning勋爵认为如果被告对另外一笔交易产生了损害赔偿的交叉诉讼，他可以另行采取诉讼：在这种情况下，他受到普通的时效限制。或者，他可以通过反诉方式提出。在1939年之前，如果他被禁止单独诉讼，他就被禁止反诉：因为反诉只是在交付之时起，见Love v.Bentley, [1938] 44 T.L.R. 388案。但是，按照第28节，一项单独交易产生的反诉与抵消处于同一地位。如果在原告发布他的诉讼令状时没有时效限制，被告可以提出反对原告的主张而不受任何时效间隔的影响。
Where the defendant has a cross-claim fordamages arising from a separate transaction, he can either bring a separateaction for it: in which case he is subject to the ordinary time bar.Alternatively, he can raise it by way of counterclaim. Before 1939, if he wastime barred for a separate action, he was time barred for a counterclaim:because the counterclaim only dated from the time of its delivery, see Love v.Bentley, [1938] 44 T.L.R. 388. But by sect. 28 a counterclaim, which arises out of a separatetransaction, is on the same footing as a set-off. If it is not time barred atthe time when the plaintiff issues his writ, the defendant can raise it inopposition to the plaintiff's claim without being affected by any intervening running of time.
Denning勋爵认为所有这些都是在单独交易中产生抵销或反诉的时候。当它不是从单独的交易中产生的，而是从同一笔交易中产生的时候，那么它就不在第28节范围之内。正如他将很快表明的那样，为了减少或者消除这个主张，可以提出，作为辩护的问题，无论是合法的还是公平的，而且作为防御问题，它不受时效限制。这就是美国的法律，其中将由同一交易产生的交叉诉讼描述为赔偿权。最高法院认为，“赔偿是由于原告起诉的交易的某些特征引起的抗辩性质，这种抗辩不受限制时效的限制，只要主要诉讼本身是及时的”，见Bull v. United States, [1935] U.S. 247案。
All this is when the set-off or counterclaim arises out of a separate transaction. When itdoes not arise out of a separate transaction, but out of the same transaction,then it is not within sect. 28 at all. It can be raised, as I will soon show,as matter of defence, either legal or equitable, so as to reduce or extinguish the claim: and, being matter of defence, it is not subject to a time bar. Suchis the law in the
关于因相同交易引起的索赔的问题，Denning勋爵认为，英国的法律将交叉诉讼（由与索赔相同的交易产生）划分为两类。
首先：当交叉诉讼直接导致索赔减少或消减时。例如货物在保修期内销售的情况，由于违反保修条款，货物价值低于合同价格。或者，在建筑物上花费工作和劳力的情况，由于缺陷，实际完成的工作价值低于合同价格。在每一个这样的案件中，显而易见的是，原告未能按照合同完成商定的工作，无权获得整个商定的金额。因此，他不应该为这笔款项收回判决，而应该只收取较少的款项。当被告说：“你没有按照商定的标准完成工作，因此你无权享有约定的价格”，这是法律上的辩护问题，而不是抵消或反诉。在典型案件Mondelv. Steel, (1841)案中，Baron Parke的言论证实了这一点：被告不应通过交叉诉讼性质的程序来抵销他因违反合同而遭受的损害赔偿金额，而仅仅是通过显示主体的损失程度来保护自己，由于违反合同，该诉讼的事项是值得的。
First: When the cross-claim goes directly in diminution or extinction of the claim. Such ascases where goods are sold with a warranty, and by reason of the breach of warranty the goods are worth less than the contract price. Or, cases where work and labour are expended on a building and, by reason of defects, the workactually done is worth less than the contract price.
In everysuch case it is plain that the plaintiff, not having completed the agreed work in accordance with the contract, is not entitled to the whole of the agreedsum. He ought not, therefore, to recover judgment for that sum, but only forthe lesser sum. When the defendant says: "You have not done the work up tothe agreed standard, and you are, therefore, not entitled to the agreed price", that is matter of defence in law and not of set-off orcounterclaim. This is borne out by the words of Baron Parke in the leading caseof Mondel v. Steel, (1841) 8 M.& W. at pp. 871-2:
It is competent for the defendant not to set-off, by a proceeding in the nature of across-action, the amount of damages which he has sustained by breach of the contract but simply to defend himself by showing how much less the subject-matter of the action was worth, by reason of the breach of contract.
Denning勋爵认为就货物销售合同而言，类似的规则现在是法定的，见1893年的“货物销售法案”第53节。买方可以设定违反保修条款的价格减少或消灭。这显然是辩护的问题。就劳动合同和劳动合同而言，这不是法定的，但Denning勋爵认为这是法律上的辩护问题，而不仅仅是抵消或反诉。尽管如此，被告以辩护方式设立起来并不是义不容辞的责任。如果他愿意，他可以支付约定的价格，并自行采取单独的诉讼来减少他所遭受的价值下降和其他任何损害，参见Davisv. Hedges，（1871）L.R.6 Q.B.687。
迄今为止，Denning勋爵认为他只考虑了由于违约导致争议事项价值较低的数额，这是法律上的辩护问题。在过去的时间里，它可以通过非欺骗的呼吁或永不负债的方式提出，这表明这是法律上的辩护。在现代，这是一个可以在没有特别通知的情况下在县级法院采取的辩护方式，参见Brightv. Rogers, [1917] 1 K.B. 219案，这个辩护不受任何时效限制。
第二，Denning勋爵认为交叉诉讼不会降低所售商品的价值或完成的工作，但会造成其他损害。例如货物延迟交付并且买方因拖延而造成损失的交叉诉讼案件，或者被雇用于清洁窗户的承包商疏忽地断开椅子腿部的情况。在过去，这种损害只能在一个单独的诉讼中被主张，见Mondelv. Steel, (1841) 8 M.& W. at p. 872案，并且在适当的情况下无疑会受到时效限制。但是，自从1873年的“司法组织法”以来，这些损害赔偿可以通过衡平抵销减少或消减索赔来设立，任何超额部分都将成为反诉的对象。 Lyndhurst，L.C.勋爵在Rawson v. Samuel, (1841) Craig &Phillips 161案，178，最近由法院在Morgan & Son v. MartinJohnson & Co., [1949] 1 K.B. 107, 及 Hanak v. Green, [1958] 2 Q.B. 9案中考虑了公平抵销的范围。只要交叉诉讼是在与索赔相同的交易中产生的，就可以使用；或者与索赔密切相关的交易。
Second: When the cross-claim does not reduce the value of the goods sold or the work done but causes other damage. Such as cases where goods are delayed in delivery andthe buyer has a cross-claim for damages for delay: or where a contractor who isemployed to clean windows negligently breaks the leg of a chair. In formertimes such damages could only be claimed in a separate action, see Mondel v.Steel, (1841) 8 M.& W. at p. 872, and would no doubt be subject to a time bar, whereappropriate. Since the Judicature Act 1873, however, these damages can be setup by way of an equitable set-off in diminution or extinction of the claim -leaving any over-plus to be the subject of a counterclaim. The scope ofequitable set-off was considered by Lord Lyndhurst, L.C., in Rawson v. Samuel,(1841) Craig & Phillips 161, at p. 178, and recently by this Court inMorgan & Son v. Martin Johnson & Co., [1949] 1 K.B. 107, and Hanak v.Green, [1958] 2 Q.B. 9. It is available whenever the cross-claim arises out of the same transaction as the claim; or out of a transaction that is closely related to the claim.
虽然它通常被形容为“衡平抵销”，Denning勋爵认为，更确切地说，它是“衡平辩护”，参见1873年“司法组织法”第24（2），（3）条和1925年“司法组织法”第38和第39条。当承包商起诉合同价时，雇主可以对他说：“你无权得到这笔款项，因为你已经破坏了你起诉的合同，而且你不能除非你考虑到你对我造成的损失，否则你不能公平地主张这笔款项”。这与被告的情况相同，即被告说原告已经通过预期违约取消了合同，或者原告已经违反了合同的根源。接受毁约后，被告解除了进一步履约责任，并可以将违约行为作为辩护理由。因此，在原告违反同一合同的情况下，被告也可以通过减少合同价格或者使合同价格消减失去权益来设定损失。这是一种辩护的本质，因此它不受时效限制。
Although it is often described as an "equitable set-off", it would, I think, bemore accurately stated to be an "equitable defence" see sect. 24 (2),(3) of the Judicature Act 1873, and sects. 38 and 39 of the Judicature Act,1925. When the contractor sues for the contract price, the employer can say tohim: "You are not entitled to that sum because you have yourself brokenthe very contract on which you sue, and you cannot fairly claim that sum unlessyou take into account the loss you have occasioned to me". It is on a par with the case of a defendant who says that the plaintiff has repudiated the contract by an anticipatory breach, or that the plaintiff has been guilty of a breach going tothe root of the contract. On accepting it, the defendant is discharged from further performance and can set up the breach as a defence. So also withany breach by the plaintiff of the self-same contract, the defendant can inequity set up his loss in diminution or extinction of the contract price. It isin the nature of a defence. As such it is not subject to a time bar.
对于适用于本案的一般原则，Denning勋爵认为，当承包商同意以固定或可确定的数额提供服务，然而，由于他在执行这些服务时的疏忽导致了雇主的损失或损害，那么当承包商起诉协议价格，雇主可以设置损失或损害的价格减少或消减。这种设置是防御性的，合法的或公平的，不受时间限制。只要主要诉讼本身是及时的，它就不受时效法规的限制。如果这个总原则适用于运输合同，那么本案中的租家是正确的。当被起诉的货物，他们可以设置损害的货物和短少交付，减少或消减的索赔。这样的设置将是辩护问题，不受12个月的时间限制，在美国是如此判的，见PuertoMadrin S.A. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., [1962] A.M.C. 147案。但问题是，这个一般原则是否适用于英格兰的货运合同。Denning勋爵不认为它确实如此。英格兰运费法律沿着自己的特殊路线发展，运费根据合同条款支付，不允许回收的辩护。
Such being the general principles, I think that when a contractor agrees to perform services for a fixed or ascertainable sum and, nevertheless, by his negligence in performing those services, causes loss or damage to the employer, then whenthe contractor sues for the agreed price, the employer can set up the loss ordamage in diminution or extinction of the price. Such setting up is matter of defence, legal or equitable, and is not subject to a time bar. It is not barredby the Statute of Limitation, so long as the main action itself is timely.
租家的代表律师KidwellQ.C.向法官们介绍了有关运费索赔的所有案例和教科书。他要求法官们承认法律中的一些最伟大的名字是错误的。但Denning勋爵并不这么认为，认为他的法官弟兄们分析了这些案例，并认为他们的观点。Denning勋爵很赞成Willes法官在Dakin v. Oxley, (1864) 15 C.B.N.S. 646案中给出了法院的有关判决，在第667页说到：
如果（所携带的物品）已经抵达，虽然已经损坏，但运费应按照租约方的一般条款支付，并且偶然损坏的问题必须由承保人解决，并且在此类损害赔偿的程序中应当承担有罪损害赔偿责任针对船长或船东。在运费诉讼中允许抵消或扣除后者的损害赔偿显然是正义的，这在一些（至少）美国是允许的。但是我们的法律不允许以这种形式进行扣除：而且目前为了迅速结算运费和其他被清算的主张而管理，它只能通过交叉诉讼向受害方提供救济。
If it (the thing carried) has arrived, though damaged, the freight is payable by the ordinary terms of the charterparty, and the question of fortuitous damage must be settled with the underwriters, and that of culpable damage in a dinstinct proceeding for such damages against the ship's captain or owners. There would be apparent justice in allowing damage of the latter sort to be set-off ordeducted in an action for freight: and this is allowed in some (at least) of the United States. But our law does not allow deduction in that form: and as at present administered for the sake perhaps of speedy settlement of freight andother liquidated demands, it affords the injured party a remedy by cross-actiononly.
Denning勋爵认为这个关于运费的规定应该像对于汇票上应付的总额的类似规则一样是合理的，或者按照现在的情况，建筑师的证明上是这样。良好的业务行为要求运费应按合同条款支付。由于货物据称在运输途中已经损坏，所以不应该支付款项。如果允许的话，这将使无良的人能够做出各种毫无根据的指控，从而避免付款。无论如何，即使是最细心的，也会导致不希望的延迟。关于损害的数量，事实上的原因，法律责任等等，可能存在争议。答案是，损害索赔应与货物保险人一起解决。他们应该赔偿货主的损害赔偿，然后决定是否由于承运人可以采取行动的过失。如果是这样，保险公司应通过代位求偿方使用货主的名义起诉承运人。他们当然会知道，根据“海牙规则”，他们必须在12个月内提起诉讼，并相应地指定仲裁员。在这种情况下，船东向货主提出了非常合理的建议。他们要求货主支付运费，并说船东的保赔协会保证支付损害赔偿索赔。货主应该已经接受了这个建议。他们没有这样做，这让他们陷入了困境。他们没有支付运费，也没有在12个月内提出损坏索赔。所以他们现在已过时效。预计他们已经与货物保险人达成了共识。保险人起初支付了索赔，但此后租家偿还了这笔费用。毫无疑问，这种偿还安排是为了应付目前出现的情况。
最终，Denning勋爵认为船东有权对交付的货物主张运费：并且不允许租金对货物交付或损坏的索赔主张。根据海牙规则，这种索赔应该在一年内提起诉讼。但并没有，因此已过时效。支持了首席仲裁员和法官的判决，租家的上诉被驳回。
In my opinion, therefore, the shipowners are entitled to the freight on the cargo delivered: and the charterers are barred from claiming for the cargo short delivered or damaged. That claim should, under the Hague Rules, have been brought by suit within one year. Not having been so brought, it is time barred.
I think the umpire and the Judge were right. I would dismiss the appeal.
总结：
在本案中，主要有三个问题：（1）作为一般规则，当提供服务的索赔以及因执行服务而被指称的违约行为引发的损害的交叉诉讼时，是否可以被视为一种纯粹的辩护，而不是通过抵消方式；（2）如果存在这样的一般规则，在索赔是运费的情况下是否有例外情况，而且交叉诉讼是指因船东过错而对装载的货物造成的损害；（3）如果只能通过抵消或反诉方式提出有关货物的交叉诉讼请求，则应受限于纳入租船合同的海牙规则第3条第6款的时效限制。
收货人因为货损货差问题，找租家索赔，而租家直接从支付给船东的运费中扣除此部分索赔。船东提出抗议，主张租家得支付全部运费，指出船东的保赔协会将处理相关索赔事宜，但租家置之不理。两年后，船东重提此运费索赔，租家仍认为此索赔可以从运费中合理抵扣。
Denning勋爵认为当诉讼令状发出时，即视为已开始诉讼。如果一方当事人给另一方发通知说指定一名仲裁员，则视为仲裁开始。但是提单并入了海牙规则，除非从货物交付之日或应交付之日起一年内提出诉讼，承运人和船舶在任何情况下都免除对灭失或损害所负的一切责任，租家因此对货物短少及损坏的索赔已超过时效。此外，Denning勋爵认为，英格兰运费法律沿着自己的特殊路线发展，运费根据合同条款支付；如果被告对另外一笔交易产生了损害赔偿的交叉诉讼，他可以另行采取诉讼：在这种情况下，他受到普通的时效限制。或者，他可以通过反诉方式提出，而非直接从运费中扣减。最终，Denning勋爵支持了仲裁员及Mocatta法官的判决，租家的上诉被驳回。
本案中其中一点值得注意的是，海牙规则货物1年的索赔时效和普通法下6年的索赔时效的冲突。作为严谨的承租人，如遇有货损货差索赔，未能在一年内解决的话，应该及时指定一名仲裁员，避免对出租人的索赔超过时效限制。
本案的判决得到了贵族院在The“Aries”案中的支持。在此案中，Aries轮从阿拉伯海湾装汽油到鹿特丹卸，但在卸港发生短货，承租人于是从支付给出租人的运费中直接扣除短货价值索赔约30,000美金。Donaldson法官认为，依据The“Brede”案，运费应该全额支付，不得因短货而从运费中直接扣除。上诉院的Denning勋爵在此案中，认为The“Brede”案的判决有约束力，上诉被驳回；但同意租家继续上诉到贵族院以判定，（a）普通法下长期以来的既定原则是否应该更改；（b）依据衡平法中古老的原则及实践，和司法组织法，是否有一衡平抵销，及（c）是否有一衡平辩护可对抗海牙规则的时效限制。
贵族院的Wilberforce勋爵在第337页判决中说到，对于货物的索赔不能通过从运费中扣除来确定，这是英国法律中一个长期以来的规定。作为一项规则，它从来没有受到司法上的怀疑或质疑或批评，它已经获得权威教科书的认可。
That a claim in respect of cargo cannot be asserted by way of deduction from the freight, is a long established rule in English law. It dates at least from Sheels v. Davies, (1814) 4 Camp. 119: it received authoritative approval in 1864 from an eminent Court in Dakin v. Oxley, (1864) 15 C.B.(N.S.) 646, and again from the same Court in Meyer v. Dresser, (1864) 33 Law J. Rep. C.P. 289, where the rule was called "settled law". As a rule it has never been judicially doubted or questioned or criticised; it has received the approval of authoritative text books. It could have been attacked, but was not, by eminent commercial counsel in Bede Steam Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Bunge y Born, (1927) 27Ll.L.Rep. 410 (incidentally a case of a time bar). It was reaffirmed after full consideration by the Court of Appeal in The Brede (
在第338页判决，Wilberforce勋爵继续说到，至于与商品销售普遍存在的规则不一致的论点，这个议会或法官的职能并不是改变既定规则或更准确地说，不同的规则是我们法律的一部分，为了与在不同领域运作的规则协调一致，除非存在内在案例，否则我会说是一个强有力的案例，用于改变前一条规则。再次引用Sumner勋爵的话：
对于像我们这样的法律制度来说，它也没有遵循一个原则可以说是真正的法律的一部分，仅仅是因为它可以更完美地表达不完善的规则，尽管这些规则不完善， 并明确界定。
As to the argument from inconsistency with the rule prevailing in relation to the sale of goods, it is no part of the functions of this House, or the Judges, to alter awell established rule or, to put it more correctly, to say that a different rule is part of our law, for the sake of harmonisation with a rule operating ina different field-not unless there is an intrinsic case, I would say a strongcase, for altering the former rule. To quote again from Lord Sumner:
Nor does it follow, in the case of a legal system such as ours, that a principle can besaid to be truly a part of the law merely because it would be a more perfect expression of imperfect rules which, though imperfect, are well established and well defined.
要做到这一点，将是法律的宏观架构，并将适用于特定类型的改革者。但是除此之外，这里有一个决定性的理由，为什么这个议院不应该改变在TheBrede案中的规则。这就是说，在这种情况下，我毫无怀疑地认为，当事方在合约的基础上违背既定规则，不得作任何扣除。承租人的上诉被驳回。
To do this would be macro-architecture of the law and would be for a particular type of reformer.
But beyond all this there is a decisive reason here why this House should not alter therule approved in The Brede by reversing it. That is that the parties in this case have, I think beyond doubt, contracted upon the basis and against th ebackground that the established rule is against deduction.
Dilhorne勋爵，Simon勋爵，Salmon勋爵，Edmundd-Davies勋爵一致同意，驳回承租人上诉。其中Salmon勋爵在第341页判决书中补充说到，这种由法律大师如Baron Parke，Baron Alderson，Erle首席法官和Willes法官和Byles先生共同确定的法治已被普遍接受100多年，并且从未受到司法质疑。在Scrutton的原始版本和后续版本中，Carver，海上货物运输等方面得到证实。作为一法律规则，特别是一项商业法规，这种法规历经这么久，并且信奉了数千份运输合同，并且每天都在制定一项条款，规定合同应受英国法律管辖，现在不能在我们的法院受到成功的挑战。
This rule of law which was fathered by such masters of the law as Baron Parke, Baron Alderson, Chief Justice Erle and Mr.Justices Willes and Byles has been generally accepted for well over 100 yearsand never judicially questioned. It has been confirmed in the original and every succeeding edition of Scruttonon Charterparties and Carver, Carriage of Goods by Sea. It was adopted in Lord Atkinson's speech, with which Lord Macnaghten and Earl Loreburn, L.C.,concurred in Kish v. Taylor [1912] A.C. 604, and recently by the Court ofAppeal in The Brede [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 333; [1974] 1 Q.B. 233. A rule of law, particularly a rule of commercial law which has stood so long and upon the faith of which many thousands of contracts of carriage have been made and are daily being madecontaining a provision that the contract shall be governed by the law of England, cannot now be successfully challenged in our Courts.
众所周知，英国乃判例法国家，先例尤其是最高法院的判决，对高等法院和上诉院等都有约束力。在2017年的In the matter of schenker ltd v.Negocios Europa Ltd案中，高等法院的Moulder法官在第6段判决书中引援了The“Aries”案，Wilberforce勋爵的陈词，并归纳如下：
I was referred to the judgment of Lord Wilberforce at 337. Lord Wilberforce said:
"…a claim in respect of cargo cannot be asserted by way of ded uction from thefreight is a long established rule in English law. As a rule, it has never been judicially doubted or questioned or criticised. It has received the approval of authoritative text books. It is said to be an arbitrary rule and so it may bein the sense that no very clear justification for it has ever been stated butthis does not affect its status in the law. It is said to be inconsistent withthe rule laid down in relation to the sale of goods and contracts for work and there are two answers to this. First, the two rules have been running inparallel for over a Century without difficulty.
"As the argument for inconsistency with the rule prevailing in relation to the sale of goods, it is no part of the functions of this House or the judges to alter awell established rule or, to put it more correctly, to say that a differentrule is part of our law for the sake of harmonisation with a rule operating ina different field.
"But beyond all this, there is a decisive reason here why this House should not alter the rule approved in The Brede byreversing it; that is that the parties in this case have, I think, beyond doubt contracted upon the basis and against the background that the established ruleis against deduction."
Moulder法官认为她的结论是被告很难接受的结论，因为货物没有在他指定的时间范围内交付，他不明白他为什么应该支付他没有收到的服务。但是，这项裁决并不影响他向索赔人索赔他所说的未能提供的能力。她注意到被告有机会提起反诉，但由于在这个判决中不需要背诵的理由，他无法在今天判决此事之前提出反诉。但是，如果在处理完毕后选择这样做，他仍然可以提出索赔。
因此，出于所有列出的理由，她发现普通法运费规则规定不能抵扣运费，这一规定延伸到航空运输。
I understand that my conclusion is one which the defendant will struggle to accept, given the fact that goods were not delivered within the timeframe hes pecified and he does not see why he should pay for a service which he did not receive. However, this ruling does not affect his ability to bring a claim against the claimant for the failures which he says occurred. I note that thedefendant had been given an opportunity to bring a counterclaim but for reasons which do not need to be recited in this judgment he was not in a position tobring a counterclaim prior to this matter being decided today. It is, however,still open to him to bring a claim should he choose to do so after this hasbeen dealt with.
Accordingly,for all the reasons set out, I find that the common law freight rule which provides that there can be no set off against freight does extend to carriage by air.
在《Scrutton onCharterparties》一书中也说到，运费支付者无权从运费中扣除损害赔偿，但将有单独的损害赔偿诉讼理由，除非由除外风险或货物本身的瑕疵造成。
The freighter will not be entitled to make deductions from the freight for the damage, but will have a separate cause of action for the damage unless caused solely by excepted perils or by the vice of the goods themselves.
从以上所列的可以看出，在英国法下，因货物短少货损方面所产生的索赔，承租人无权从支付给出租人的运费中直接扣减；但承租人有单独的损害赔偿的诉讼理由，可以独立找出租人索赔损害赔偿，除非这些货损货差是合同列明的出租人的除外风险或者是由货物本身瑕疵所造成。这一原则，不仅适用于海上货物运输，也适用于公路运输及航空运输。
海运圈聚焦专栏作者 Alex （微信公众号 航运佬）
