SANCHI & CF CRYSTAL 东海撞船----桑吉轮事故分析摘要

2018-05-1010403
  1. 撞船时间: 如下图SANCHI 雷达显示:世界时UTC 11:50(+8), 当地时间 LT 19:50, 船上值班应该用当地时间---Local Time--- LT 19:50.
  


  船上航行值班:12:00---16:00; 16:00---20:00; 20:00---24:00如严格按照整点、准时交接班制度,此时,应是三副和大副交接班时期,19:50属于大副责任期,而且交接班不清。
  


  2. 撞船地点:
  


  3. MT SANCHI撞船前概况

  16.12.2017 M/T Sanchi

  —Departure from Assaluyeh Port, Iran

  —Cargo: Natural gas condensate (highly flammable, toxic, and of lesser pollution ability, due to aromatic nature),111,510 tons

  —Destination: Daesan Port, South Korea

  —ETA: 08.01.2018

  —No deficiency in PSC report.

  —All seafarers hold valid certificate of competency and medical fitness.

  —Built in 2008

  4.CF CRYSTAL撞船前概况

  15.12.2017 CF-Crystal

  —Departure from Kalama Port, US

  —Cargo: Sorghum, 63,997.817 tons

  —Destination: Dongguan, China

  —ETA: 10.01.2018

  —No deficiency in PSC report

  —All seafarers hold valid certificate of competency and medical fitness.

  —Built in 2011

  5. CFCRYSTAL事故后照片
  

艏尖舱,NO.1&2货舱火烧变色

  6. MT SANCHI撞船瞬间和撞船后燃爆、沉没照片。
  




  7. Information exchanged includes:

  信息交换包括:

  —(1) Ship certificates, crew certificates, company safety management system documents,PSC inspection reports, general arrangement plan and maneuver ability information.

  船舶证书,船员证书,公司安全管理体系文件,PSC报告,总布置图和操纵信息。

  —(2) Analysis of the AIS dynamic data and voyage related data of SANCHI, SANCHI’s VDR playback information and identity of watch keepers on SANCHI’s bridge at the time of the accident.

  AIS动态数据分析和SANCHI轮航行参数,VDR信息和事故发生时SANCHI驾驶台值班人员身份。

  —(3) The distressalert of SANCHI’s INMARSAT C and survey of SANCHI’s shipwreck.

  SANCHI轮INMARSATC 发出的遇险警报和失事船舶残骸调查。

  —(4) SANCHI’s Last port departure report,bill of lading, stowage plan and cargo characteristics.

  SANCHI轮上港离港报,装货单,配载计划和货物特性。

  —(5) The progress of the technical recovery of CF CRYSTAL’s VDR data.

  CF CRYSTAL轮VDR参数的技术回复进展

  —(6) VDR data from MAERSK SHAMS and TRF MONGSTAD. 5

  两条附近船MAERSK SHAMS and TRF MONGSTAD. 5

  VDR参数。

  —(7) Pictures and videodata of Emergency response and SAR.

  应急反应和搜救的照片、录像资料数据。

  —(8) Interview of CFCRYSTAL’screw.

  CF CRYSTAL轮船员的询问

  8. 权威结论,自行解读

  Chaina & Hong Kong

  —This accident happened in open waters with good visibility (about 10 nm). Both SANCHI and CF CRYSTAL were power-driven vessels underway. According to COLREGS, the two vessels were in a crossing situation, in which SANCHI was the give-way vessel and CF CRYSTAL was the stand-on vessel.

  —As a give-way vessel(让路船) in a cross situation of Rule 15,SANCHI did not take actions as required. This is the main contributing factor to the collision.

  Chaina & Hong Kong

  —(1) During avoiding collision with small

  vessels,the 3/O attitude was negative(消极态度). He expected the small vessel to take action even SANCHI is give way vessel(让路船).

  —(2) Before the accident, the AB on duty repeatedly reminded the 3/O to take action, but the latter was too confident and did not take action(太自信而不采取措施).

  —(3) The 3/O stayed in the chart room for too long leaving only the AB as the sole look out in the bridge.

  —(4) 3/O talked with the AB about things that had nothing to do with navigation.

  —(5) There were 20 to 25 degrees differences of COG and 2 to 3 knots differences of SOG betweenthe SANCHI’s AIS information received by other vessels and the readout of SANCHI’s VDR.

  IRAN / PANAMA / BANGLADESH

  —4.3.3.1 Main causal factor

  —1. Alteration of CFCrystal course to starboard starting 15 minutes prior to the collision developed the situation which would otherwise had been clear in to a collision.

  —4.3.3.2 Contributory Factors

  —1. CFCrystal’s watch keeping personnel had notnoticed(没看到) the Sanchi’s presence up to the time of collision.

  —2. Both of the vessels had not noticed the change in navigational status of the other.

  —3. AIS had been used on board CF Crystal as the sole means of collision avoidance.

  —4. CF Crystal had not noticed the flashing signals given by the Sanchi.

  —5. No proper hand over/take over(交接班) between the CF Crystal’s watch keeping officers.

  —6. Improper use of the AIS as a navigational aid in notidentifying the surrounding vessels.

  结语:

  事故已发生,惟愿逝者安息,生者警醒前行,航海是高风险的职业;航海肩章上四道杠,Profession/Knowledge/Skill/Responsibility代表着专注专业、博学多闻、技术能力和责任心,这是对船长和轮机长的要求,其中责任心最重要,这也应是所有航海人的普遍追求和信仰;国际航运安全管理报告说,85%的事故来源于人为事故,此言不虚,但是没有海员的努力、奉献和牺牲,占世界贸易85%以上的海上运输将停滞和瘫痪。

  就象战士战争,这将会有伤害和牺牲,航海,同样是勇敢者征服大自然的战争,在新形势下,更多的还有保护大自然的要求,航海伤亡等安全事故, 甚至不可避免;但通过安全管理和风险管理能够减少事故产生的数量和降低事故的危害等级,愿海员兄弟姐妹们能够提高安全管理的意识、能力和水平,培养风险意识,对潜在的风险能够警醒、定义、识别、分析、评估和预防;端正工作态度、 高高兴兴地上船,平平安安地回家。

  部分材料和照片摘自“桑吉轮事故报告”,

  特此,致礼!感谢!

  海运圈专栏作者:时阳老轨 整理(hiFleet总经理助理)