2017-11-05
1007 
【摘要】基于多种原因，合约起草者未能恰当地表达当事人的真实意图；有时候因为措辞本身也有多种含义，最终导致了合约不够清晰明确，对于条款的含义有多种解释。那么如果出现差异，该如何恰当地来解释合约呢？本文通过典型案例，Rainy Sky一案的介绍来说明这个问题。
【关键词】合约、商业合理性、债券、退款保证
在实务中，基于多种原因 ，比如合约起草者本身水平高低，对于事实认定不清，措辞使用含糊不清导致了对于合约有不同的解读。Sumption勋爵说过，当事人双方协议的言辞应作为一个整体来解读，这是唯一可以采纳的能够证明当事人双方意图的直接证据。他认为一定不会主张将文字主义作为解释的一种方法，如果认为语言只是在某些特定的背景下才有意义，这是一个谬误。
大多数语言和所有起草的措辞都具有其自身意义，贬低词典和语法作为解释的手段是非常不正常的。语言是一种沟通方式，其功效取决于是否接受了一些使人们能够理解的惯例。词典和语法只是记录这些惯例的参考书，如果我们放弃了将把它们作为基本的解释工具，我们就不再能发现各方是如何相互理解的。法官不能重塑一份合同来帮助不明智的一方或者说来惩罚老谋深算的一方。如Sumption所说，商业合同本身可能是最不合理的，因此法官也不能重塑一份合同以便符合商业合理性。
但是作为合约解释上典型的案例，有必要来看看本文将介绍的Rainy Sky案。
一、Factual background
在2007年5月11日，Rainy Sky S.A. and Others (以下简称“买家”)与JinseShipbuilding Co., Ltd(以下简称“船厂”)签订了关于六艘船的造船合同（以下简称“合同”）。根据合同，船厂同意为每个买家建造和出售一艘船。每艘船舶的售价为33,300,000美元，买家得在指定时间内安排付款，该笔钱分5期支付，每期6,660,000美元，最后一期在交船的时候支付。根据合同第X.8条，买家第一笔付款的先决条件是，船厂将以买家融资人可接受的形式向买家退还与第一笔和后续分期付款相关的退款担保。按照第十条第8款的规定，2007年8月22日的信函，答辩人，Kookmin Bank（以下简称“银行”）向每个买家发出了6件完全相同的“预付款债券”（以下简称“债券”）。第七个索赔人（“受让人”）是债权人的受益人。
2007年8月29日，买家各自按合同支付第一笔6,660,000美元船款。 2007年9月29日，第一个索赔人根据其所签订的合同支付了第二笔6,660,000美元。
2008年，船厂经历了财务困难，并于2009年1月底开启了和/或根据2007年“韩国企业重组推进法”进行了债务偿还程序。2009年2月25日，买家写信给船厂，指出破产形式触发了合同第十二条第3款，要求立即退还已支付的所有分期付款，连同利息为年息7％。船厂以合同第XII.3条未被触发为由，拒绝支付任何退款。买家与船厂之间的争议于是按照合同第十四条第三款提交仲裁。
2009年4月23日，买方写信给银行要求根据合同支付的分期付款的债券进行还款。银行拒绝支付，银行最初的理由是没有义务在买家和船厂之间解决争议之前安排退款。但是这个狡辩被Simon法官给否决了，银行对于法官这点上的判决并没有向上诉法院提出上诉。但是随后，银行提出了一个额外的，辩称，按真实的解释，逻辑上债券不包括买家根据合同第十二条第三款有权享有的退款。
这个辩解也被法官驳回，法官对于受让人作出简要判决；但是在上诉法院中胜出，SimonTuckey勋爵支持法庭观点，但Thorpe和PattenLJJ等多数人认为银行的观点是正确的。法官和上诉法院的命令分别于2009年10月29日和2010年5月27日达成。
买家根据法院许可，向最高法院提出上诉。问题是，根据债券第3段的真正的解释，依据合同第十二条第3款，买家是否有权根据债券获得退款？
二、The Bonds
Clarke勋爵首先从债券开始说起，因为这是双方的共同点，所有这一切争议都取决于债券的真正解释，合同的条款和意义只与它们通知债券的真正解释有关。包括债券的信件中的段落没有编号，但法官和上诉法院都以数字的形式提到了这些段落，方便参考，Clarke勋爵他也这样做。
为避免误解，债券相关部分的内容其原文如下：
[1] We refer tothe … Contract entered into between … the Builder and yourselves for the construction and delivery of … the 'Vessel' to be delivered before [31 July2009]. Other terms and expressions used in this Bond shall have the samemeaning as in the Contract, a copy of which has been provided to us.
[2] Pursuant tothe terms of the Contract, you are entitled, upon your rejection of the Vessel in accordance with theterms of the Contract, your termination, cancellation or rescission of theContract or upon a Total Loss of the Vessel, to repayment of thepre-delivery instalments of the Contract Price paid by you prior to suchtermination or a Total Loss of the Vessel (as the case may be) and the value ofthe Buyer's Supplies delivered to the Shipyard (if any) together with interestthereon at the rate of ... (7%) per annum (or ... (10%) per annum in the caseof a Total Loss of the Vessel) from the respective dates of payment by you ofsuch instalments to the date of remittance by telegraphic transfer of suchrefund.
[3] Inconsideration of your agreement to make the pre-delivery instalments under the Contractand for other good and valuable consideration (the receipt and adequacy ofwhich is hereby acknowledged), we hereby, as primary obligor, irrevocably andunconditionally undertake to pay to you, your successors and assigns, on yourfirst written demand, all such sums due to you under the Contract (or such sums which would havebeen due to you but for any irregularity, illegality, invalidity orunenforceability in whole or in part of the Contract) PROVIDED THAT the totalamount recoverable by you under this Bond shall not exceed US $[26,640,000] ...plus interest thereon at the rate of ... (7%) per annum (or ... (10%) per annumin the case of a Total Loss of the Vessel) from the respective dates of paymentby you of such instalments to the date of remittance by telegraphic transfer ofsuch refund.
[4] Payment byus under this Bond shall be made without any deduction or withholding, andpromptly on receipt by us of a written demand (substantially in the formattached) signed by two of your directors stating that the Builder has failedto fulfil the terms and conditions of the Contract and as a result of suchfailure, the amount claimed is due to you and specifying in what respects theBuilder has so failed and the amount claimed. Such claim and statement shall beaccepted by us as evidence for the purposes of this Bond alone that this amountclaimed is due to you under this Bond.
[5] Ourliability under this Bond shall not be affected by … (v) any insolvency,re-organisation or dissolution of the Builder, or (vi) any other matter orthing which may operate to discharge or reduce our liability hereunder.
债券进一步规定，它们是可转让的，它们受英国法律管辖，所引起的所有争议均由商业法院裁定。
双方之间争议的解决取决于第[3]段的真正解释。银行
承诺按要求支付“all such sums due to you underthe Contract”,即根据合同向您支付的所有款项。 问题是“such sums”到底是什么意思。解释起来只有两种可能。一种是如买家所说（法官和SimonTurckey爵士所判），“such sums”一词回到第一行的“pre-delivery instalments”,交船前的付款。他们说，债券的目的是保证交付前分期付款的退款，因此承诺是退还分期付款。相比之下，银行（Thorpe和Patten LJJ所判）表示，“such sums”是第[2]款提及的款项的参考，即偿还在终止前支付的分期付款总损失的合同或总损失以及买家所供应的东西的价值。买家分析，债券保证在任何任破产的情况下， 依据第十二条第3款偿还交付前分期；而银行的分析，事实并非如此。
三、The Contracts
Clarke勋爵认为合约的条款与债券的真正解释是相关的。它们在债券中被提及，并提供了债券并入的直接背景。因此，合同条款它们显然对债券含义的理解有重要帮助。
合同的相关条款如下：
ARTICLE X: PAYMENT
5. REFUND BY THE BUILDER
…
The payments made by the Buyer to the Builder prior to delivery of the Vessel shall constitute advances to the Builder. If the Vessel is rejected by the Buyer in accordance with the terms of this Contract, or if the Buyerterminates, cancels or rescinds this Contract pursuant to any of the provisions of this Contract specifically permitting the Buyer to do so, the Builder shallforthwith refund to the Buyer in US dollars, the full amount of total sums paidby the Buyer to the Builder in advance of delivery together with interest there on as herein provided within thirty (30) banking days of acceptance of rejection.
... The interest rate of the refund … shall be seven per cent (7%) perannum …
If the Builder is required to refund to the Buyer the installments paid by the Buyer to the Builder as provided in this Paragraph, the Builder shallreturn to the Buyer all of the Buyer's Supplies as stipulated in Article XIII which were not incorporated into the Vessel and pay to the Buyer an amountequal to the cost to the Buyer of those Buyer's Supplies incorporated into theVessel.
6. TOTAL LOSS
If there is a total loss or a constructive total loss of the Vessel priorto delivery thereof, the Builder shall proceed according to the mutual agreement of the parties hereto either:
(a) to build another vessel in place of the Vessel so lost ... providedthat the parties hereto shall have agreed in writing to a reasonable cost andtime for the construction … or
(b) to refund to the Buyer the full amount of the total sums paid by theBuyer to the Builder under the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Article andthe value of Buyer's Supplies delivered to the Shipyard, if any, together with interest there on at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum ...
If the parties hereto fail to reach such agreement within two (2) monthsafter the Vessel is determined to be a total loss or constructive total loss,the provisions of (b) hereinabove shall be applied."
…
8. REFUND GUARANTEE
The Builder shall as a condition precedent to payment by the Buyer of thefirst installment deliver to the Buyer an assignable letter of guarantee issuedby a first class Korean Bank .... to Buyer's Financiers for the refund of thefirst installment, and at the same time, together with the letter of guaranteerelating to the first installment, Builder shall also deliver to the Buyer anassignable letter of guarantee issued by a first class Korean Bank .... for therefund of the respective installments following the way of the paymentstipulated in this Article. The refund guarantees by the Builder to the Buyershall be indicated pre-delivery installments plus interest as aforesaid to theBuyer under or pursuant to paragraph 5 above in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit 'A' which is yet to be agreed…
In the event that the Refund Guarantees, forall installments, have not been provided to the Buyer in a form acceptable tothe Buyer's financiers and have not been issued by an entity acceptable toBuyer's financiers, by the 31st of August 2007 then the Buyermay cancel this Contract without penalty on either side.
第8条是关于退款保证的约定，但事实上并没有任何形式的担保是附属于合同。合同第十二条规定如下：
ARTICLE XII: BUILDER'S DEFAULT
…
3. If the Builder shall apply for or consent to the appointment of a receiver, trustee or liquidator, shall be adjudicated insolvent, shall applyto the courts for protection from its creditors, file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or take advantage of any insolvency law, or any action shall betaken by the Builder having an effect similar to any of the foregoing or theequivalent thereof in any jurisdiction, the Buyer may by notice in writing tothe Builder require the Builder to refund immediately to the Buyer the fullamount of all sums paid by the Buyer to the Builder on account of the Vessel and interest thereon at seven percent (7%) per annum on the amount to be refundedto the Buyer, computed from the respective date such sums were paid by the Buyer to the date of remittance of the refundable amount to the Buyer andimmediately upon receipt of such notice the Builder shall refund such amount tothe Buyer. Following such refund the Builder may, but shall not be obliged to,by notice in writing to the Buyer given within ten (10) business days terminatethis contract. If the Builder does not so terminate the Contract the Buyer'sobligation to pay further installments prior to delivery of the Vessel underArticle X 2(a),(b),(c) and (d) shall be suspended and the full Contract priceshall be paid to the Builder upon delivery of the Vessel in the mannercontemplated by Article X paragraph 2(e).
如果船厂申请或同意委任接管人，受托人或清盘人，应被裁定无力偿债，应向法院申请保护其债权人，提出自愿申请破产或利用破产法或者船厂采取任何行动，其效力与任何司法管辖区的上述任何一种或其等同物相同，买加可以书面通知船厂，要求船厂立即向买家退还全额款项，所有由买方支付给船厂的所有款项，按照每年7％向买家退还所支付的款项。
合同包含一些买家有权要求取消合同的规定，即第III.1条和第XII.1条（延迟）和第III.2（b）条，第3（c）条，第4（d）条和第5条）（速度不足，燃油消耗过量，载重量或货物舱容不足）。其中一些规定具体授权买家在取消之后退还所有预付款。合同还载于第十三条有关买家所供物料的进一步详细规定。
四、The correct approach to construction
Clarke勋爵认为，在大多数情况下，如同任何合同一样，债券的正确解释方法并没有什么争议。这些原则在许多先例中已经讨论过，正如Neuberger勋爵在Pink FloydMusic Ltd v EMI Records Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 1429案，Hoffmann勋爵在Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance CoLtd [1997] AC 749案，及InvestorsCompensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896案和 Chartbrook Ltdv Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101案中所阐述的。Clarke勋爵他认同Neuberger勋爵所说，这些案件表明，解释合同条款，特别是商业合同的最终目的是确定各方使用的语言是什么意思，这涉及到确定合理的人们会理解各方的意思。又如Hoffmann勋爵在InvestorsCompensation Scheme Ltd案中，所总结的第一条原则中所说的，有关合理的人士是指那些在合同当时可合理获得拥有所有背景知识的人。
The relevant reasonable person is one who has all the background knowledge which wouldreasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which theywere at the time of the contract.
在上诉中，当事人双方主要的争议是，在确定各方的意图时应考虑到商业合理性的作用。SimonTuckey爵士在他的第19段判决中表示，关于解释和银行提出的框架性论据没有任何争议。然而，Clarke勋爵并不认为这是正确的。Simon爵士在第18段确定了前文第9段所述的大量合约解释的问题，并在第19段判决中说道，为了回答这个问题，解释的原则没有争议，法院必须首先看看当事人在债券本身中使用的词语，造船合同当然是债券的背景和原因，但是是不同方面的单独合同。如果债券的语言明确地得出结论，认为其中一个或另一个解释是正确的，法院必须实行，不过令人惊奇或不合理的结果可能是。但是，如果有两个可能的解释，法院有权拒绝那个不合理的，在商业上违反商业合理性的那个。
There is no dispute about the principles of construction to be applied in order to answer this question. The court mustfirst look at the words which the parties have used in the bond itself. The shipbuilding contract is of course the context and cause for the bond but is nevertheless a separate contract between different parties. If the language ofthe bond leads clearly to a conclusion that one or other of the constructionscontended for is the correct one, the Court must give effect to it, however surprising or unreasonable the result might be. But if there are two possible constructions, the Court is entitled to reject the one which is unreasonableand, in a commercial context, the one which flouts business common sense. This follows from the House of Lords decisions in Wickman Machine Tools Sales Limited v Schuler AG [1974] AC 235,where at 251 Lord Reid said:
'The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant consideration. The more unreasonable the result, the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it, and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they shall make that intention abundantly clear.'
and The Antaios [1984] AC 191, where at 201 Lord Diplock said:
'If detailed and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contractis going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense it must yield to business common sense.'"
Simon Tuckey爵士引援了贵族院在Wickman Machine Tools SalesLimited v Schuler AG [1974] AC 235案，Reid勋爵所说的，一个特定的架构导致一个非常不合理的结果这一事实必须一番妥当的考虑。结果越不合理，就不太可能是当事人意图，如果他们打算更有必要，那么这个意图就应更加明确。以及Diplock勋爵在The “Antaios”案中所说的，如果商业合同中的措辞的详细和句法分析将导致一个悖离商业合理性的结论，它必须让步于商业合理性。
Clarke勋爵认为但他看到SimonTuckey爵士的判决时，Patten勋爵对于此问题的处理方式并不一致。这可以从他第35至44段的判决看出。在第35段，他提到Simon Tuckey爵士在第19段的做法（如上所述）。他还提到了法官第18（iii）段的判决，法官描述了银行对债券的解释，因为在出现破产的情况下，该担保不可用于满足船厂偿还债务的担保是令人惊讶和非商业的结果。Patten 勋爵指出，法官似乎已将其视为有利于买家对债券第[3]段解释的一个因素。Patten 勋爵补充说法官的做法与Simon Tuckey爵士的做法相同。
Patten 勋爵提及上述案件，在第42段做出了他的判决：在这种情况下（如其他大多数情况），法院不对双方之间的谈判不信任，或者商业和其他压力可能决定了合同的利益平衡，除非这个词的最自然的意义产生结果是如此极端，表明这是无意的，法院别无选择，只能使其条款生效，否则将是冒险对一方或另一方承担义务，他们从不愿意承担义务相当于本法院猜测的情况。
In this case (as in most others) the Court isnot privy to the negotiations between the parties or to the commercial and other pressures which may have dictated the balance of interests which thecontract strikes. Unless the most natural meaning of the words produces aresult which is so extreme as to suggest that it was unintended, the Court hasno alternative but to give effect it its terms. To do otherwise would be torisk imposing obligations on one or other party which they were never willing to assume and in circumstances which amount to no more than guesswork on thepart of the Court.
最后，在第43和44段，Patten 勋爵引用了Wilberforce勋爵在Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 案中，及Hoffmann勋爵在Chartbrook案中的陈词，他们讨论了排除合同前谈判证据的原因。特别是他们强调了当事人主观意图的不相关性，并指出，合同中的一个条款似乎对一方或另一方特别不利的事实是无关紧要的。正如Hoffmann勋爵所说，这个条款可能已经得到同意，以换取在交易中其他地方作出的一些让步，或者可能只是一个不好的交易。
Clarke勋爵认为他完全同意这些观点，不过在他看来，Patten 勋爵在第42段所述的原则与法官在第18（iii）段和Simon Tuckey爵士在第19段中所述的原则不同。Clarke勋爵认为他没有必要对此做出判决，除非这个词的最自然的含义产生如此极端的结果，以表明这是无意的，否则法院必须实现这个意思。
It is not in my judgment necessary to conclude that, unless the most natural meaning of thewords produces a result so extreme as to suggest that it was unintended, thecourt must give effect to that meaning.
Clarke勋爵认为双方使用的语言通常会有一个以上的潜在意义。他会接受代表上诉人提交的意见，即行使解释在本质上是一个单一的行动，法院必须考虑使用的语言，并确定合理的人，即具有合理的背景知识的人在合同当时的情况下可以向各方提供，理解当事人的意图。在这样做时，法院必须考虑到所有有关的背景环境。如果有两种可能的解释，法院有权选择符合商业合理性的解释，而拒绝另一种解释。
The language used by the parties will often have more than one potential meaning. I wouldaccept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the exercise of construction is essentially one unitary exercise in which the court must consider the language used and ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of thecontract, would have understood the parties to have meant. In doing so, thecourt must have regard to all the relevant surrounding circumstances. If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other.
这个结论，在Clarke勋爵看来Simon Tuckey爵士所引援的Wickman案中，Reid勋爵的做法得到支持。Clarke勋爵认为他当然清楚，在特定个案中，在考虑一般原则的陈述时，法庭必须考虑到这个命题的确切提述可能会受到案情的影响。不过，有一个一致的意见，大部分由买家在其案件的附录中整理校勘，这支持法官和Simon Tuckey爵士的做法。
Clarke勋爵认为当事方使用清晰明确的语言，法院必须采纳。
Where the parties have used unambiguouslanguage, the court must apply it.
这可以从上诉法院在Co-operativeWholesale Society Ltd v. National Westminster Bank plc [1995]案的判决可以看出来。法院正在考虑在许多不同情况下租赁条款真正解释。业主在每一宗案件中寻求的根本结果是一样的，法庭认为这是最不可能的商业结果。结果虽然不尽如人意，从该条款的明确语言得出，业主成功，但如果没有，他们就失败了。法院认为，普通解释原则适用于租赁审查条款并在The Antaios案中采纳了该原则。Hoffmann勋爵在第98页说道：然而，这个强有力的声明并不意味着可以重写双方所使用的语言，以使合同符合商业合理性。但语言是一种非常灵活的工具，如果能够进行多个解释，则选择似乎最有可能实现协议商业目的的语言。
This robust declaration does not, however,mean that one can rewrite the language which the parties have used in order tomake the contract conform to business common sense. But language is a very flexible instrument and, if it is capable of more than one construction, onechooses that which seems most likely to give effect to the commercial purposeof the agreement.
法院也包括Leggatt和Simon Brown 爵士，在第101页说，考虑到业主辩论的不大可能的结果，只有最明确的这些条款可以适当地被发现承受业主的解释，而在只有一个租赁的情况下，条款“毫不含糊地实现了业主争议的不可能的结果”。这个案件是令人感兴趣的，因为Simon Brown爵士认为，在其他三起案件中，一个明确地没有达到业主要求的结果，而另外两个案子，他在第102页这样说：对于我来说，我会接受，更明显的看法，两者都赞成业主的解释。然而，我被说服，他们有能力，因此，由于已经给出的理由，应该有所不同。
因此，这一案例是采纳和适用法官和SimonBrown爵士所赞同的原则的一个例子。此外也可以参International Fina Services AG v Katrina Shipping Ltd, The Fina Samco [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 344案，Neill勋爵在第350页说，在解释商业文件时，有必要将其归结为符合商业常识的意义。
It is necessary to remember that this is a commercial document and thatone must therefore strive to attribute to it a meaning which accords withbusiness commonsense.
Steyn勋爵在1997年，在他那本司法书籍《Contract Law:Fulfilling the reasonable expectations of honest men》，写道：通常，考虑中的语言通常没有明显的或普通的含义。有相互竞争的解释被考虑，在选择替代方案之间，法院应主要以有关规定所出现的上下文的背景进行指导。法官认为合同的商业目的比语言的优点更重要，而且，如果有疑问，工作假设是一个公平的解释最符合双方的合理期望。
Often there is no obvious or ordinary meaning of the language under consideration. There are competing interpretations to be considered. In choosing between alternatives a court should primarily be guidedby the contextual scene in which the stipulation in question appears. And speaking generally commercially minded judges would regard the commercialpurpose of the contract as more important than niceties of language. And, inthe event of doubt, the working assumption will be that a fair constructionbest matches the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Clarke勋爵他同意Steyn勋爵所说。在Society of Lloyd's vRobinson [1999]案中，Steyn勋爵也说了基本上一致的话：对于在其背景下阅读的商业合同，文书或文件的文本的忠诚是最重要的解释原则，但在解释商业文件语言含义的过程中，法院应该普遍倾向于商业上明智的这种做法的原因是商业解释可能会使双方的意图发挥作用，所以应该以合理的商业人士解释的方式来解释，合理的商业人士可以安全地被认为对技术诠释和对语言的微妙过度强调不被忽视。
Loyalty to the text of a commercial contract,instrument, or document read in its contextual setting is the paramountprinciple of interpretation. But in the process of interpreting the meaning ofthe language of a commercial document the court ought generally to favour acommercially sensible construction. The reason for this approach is that acommercial construction is likely to give effect to the intention of theparties. Words ought therefore to be interpreted in the way in which areasonable commercial person would construe them. And the reasonable commercialperson can safely be assumed to be unimpressed with technical interpretations and undue emphasis on niceties of language.
现有的类似的判例，如在Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance CoLtd [2001] CLC 1103案中，Mance勋爵在第13段和第16段判决书中说道：该条款没有非常自然的意义，至少可以接受两种可能的含义或解释：一种是法官，另一种是解决两个单独的主题事项。在这种情况下，法官行使拒绝开庭的行为尤其重要，即考虑每次解释的影响。在我看来，法院在解释任何文件时，应该始终关注特定解释的后果，即使他们经常只是通过一种可以想到但不具有商业意义的含义来作为对明显含义的复核。
Construction, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR said in Arbuthnott v Fagan [1995] CLC1396 at p 1400 is thus 'a composite exercise, neither uncompromisingly literalnor unswervingly purposive'. To para (5), one may add as a coda words of LordBridge in Mitsui Construction CoLtd v A-G of Hong Kong (1986) 33 BLR 14, cited in my judgmentin Sinochem International Oil(London) Ltd v Mobil Sales and Supply Corp [2000] CLC 878 at p 885.Speaking of a poorly drafted and ambiguous contract, Lord Bridgesaid that poor drafting itself provides:
'no reason to depart from the fundamental rule of construction ofcontractual documents that the intention of the parties must be ascertainedfrom the language that they have used interpreted in the light of the relevant factual situation in which the contract was made. But the poorer the quality ofthe drafting, the less willing the court should be to be driven by semanticniceties to attribute to the parties an improbable and unbusinesslikeintention, if the language used, whatever it may lack in precision, is reasonably capable of an interpretation which attributes to the parties anintention to make provision for contingencies inherent in the work contractedfor on a sensible and businesslike basis.'
…
... in my judgment the subclause has no verynatural meaning and is, at the least, open to two possible meanings orinterpretations - one the judge's, the other that it addresses two separate subject-matters. In these circumstances, it is especially important toundertake the exercise on which the judge declined to embark, that is toconsider the implications of each interpretation. In my opinion, a court when construing any document should always have an eye to the consequences of aparticular construction, even if they often only serve as a check on an obviousmeaning or a restraint upon adoption of a conceivable but unbusinesslikemeaning. In intermediate situations, as Professor Guest wisely observesin Chitty on Contracts (28thedn) vol 1, para. 12-049, a 'balance has to be struck' through the exercise ofsound judicial discretion.
在Homburg Houtimport BVv Agrosin Private Ltd: The Starsin [2004] 1 AC 715案中，Bingham勋爵说到，商业意识将被给予商业文件，商业意识在于，在平常交易过程中哪些商人会提供文件。
First is the rule to which Lord Halsbury alluded in Glynn v Margetson & Co [1893] AC351 at 359, "that a business sense will be given to businessdocuments". The business sense is that which businessmen, in the course oftheir ordinary dealings, would give the document.
最后，Clarke勋爵认为，值得从Barclays Bank plc v HHY Luxembourg SARL [2010] EWCA Civ 1248案中摘录两段Longmore勋爵的陈词：事情不能搁置一边，当有替代解释可以使用的话，必须考虑哪个更具有商业意义。如果这个条款规定了一个非常有限的释放条款，但是对于这个问题来说，这不是一个很好的办法。如果一个条款有两个意思，就像这个条款一样，很有可能这两个意思都不会被忽略。在这种情况下，采用更多而不是较少的商业解释更为合适。
25. The matter does not of course rest there because when alternative constructions are available one has to consider which is the more commerciallysensible. On this aspect of the matter Mr Zacaroli has all the cards.
26. The judge said that it did not floutcommon sense to say that the clause provided for a very limited level ofrelease, but that, with respect, is not quite the way to look at the matter. Ifa clause is capable of two meanings, as on any view this clause is, it is quitepossible that neither meaning will flout common sense. In such circumstances,it is much more appropriate to adopt the more, rather than the less, commercialconstruction.
Clarke勋爵认为，LongmoreLJ已经整理了正确的方法来解决问题,这种方式得到了权威当局的支持。如上文第21段所述，稍微详细说明，实质上是，如果一个合约有多于一种解释的话，则通常采用最符合商业合理性的解释。由于这些原因，我更倾向于法官和Simon Brown爵士所解释的方式，对于Patten勋爵的观点，在我看来，在这一点上显著不同。
It is inessence that, where a term of a contract is open to more than oneinterpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation whichis most consistent with business common sense.
五、Applicationto the facts
如上所述，债券第[3]段有两种可能的解释得到推进。银行代表律师向上诉法院承认，这两个解释都是有争议的。Clarke勋爵认为他不明白在本法院银行代表律师Philipps QC辞去这一论点。无论如何，根据他的判断，确实有两种可能的解释。
银行的解释强有力的地方是，如果买家对[3]段的解释是正确的，就不难看出债券条款中第[2]段的要点。另一方面，买家的解释是直接的。银行在第[3]段中做作的承若是，“in consideration of your [ie the Buyers'] agreement to make thepre-delivery instalments … we hereby, as primary obligor, promise to pay to you, your successors and assigns, on your first written demand, all such sumsdue to you under the Contract …”。在不存在第[2]段的情况下，毫无疑问的是，提及“such sums”是在第[3]段的开头提到“pre-delivery instalments”之后。这非常有意义，因为人们自然期待各方同意，买家融资者坚持，万一，例如，船厂破产，买家应该有退还他们已支付的交船前分期付款的担保。
现在的问题是第[2]段落的存在是否导致不同的结论。银行的代表律师Philipps强有力地主张，答案是是。他正确主张，第[3]段落必须在其上下文被解释，上下文的一部分是第[2]段，这是当然的紧接在前的段落。他提出，唯一的目的也已经可以为包括在债券第[2]段落的是确定第[3]段的范围。他进一步提出，买家代表并没有提出列入第[2]段中其他合理的解释。
Clarke勋爵他承认，买家代表并没有提交关于债券条款中列入第[2]段很好的理由。他们所能做的最好的解释是说，这是一个序言段[3]的执行条款，它只是设置了一些买家的权利，合同规定，它的目的不是为了确定银行在债券项下的责任范围。Patten勋爵在第50段同意此观点，该买家的解释是值得商榷的。但说，在他看来，这并不是说该文件将传达给一个合理的人，当在阅读的时候已经知晓条款的含义。Clarke勋爵他认为，这必须意味着他认同，虽然这是值得商榷的，它有这样的效果，但实际上没有这样做。否则，买家的解释不能以任何相关意义上已经被认为是有争议的，Patten勋爵肯定不会将其描述为这样。虽然他认为这两种解释是值得商榷的意义上说，债券可能会传达任何解释提高到一个合理的人在读债券与合同条款的认识，在他看来，银行的解释显然是首选。如果Patten勋爵在第51段，更进一步后来说，这涵盖船厂的破产实际上是可取的，否则将是“债券的自然和明显的解释”出发，Clarke勋爵他尊重不同意见，但他不认为银行的解释作为债券的自然和普通的含义。
Clarke勋爵认为他已经考虑了他自己的竞争性的辩论，因此得出的结论，比Patten勋爵和银行的解释更为微妙平衡。Clarke勋爵认为他不会完全接受分析。债券第[2]段重现了第X.5条和合同的第X.6的条款，但在Clarke勋爵他看来这条并没有遵守X.8条的要求。在他看来，第X.8没有提供在该债券将予发行的条款。它要求两份担保需要提供，首先由第一类韩国银行或担保保险公司为第一笔的退款和第二以“一流的韩国银行或担保保险公司出具接受的买家按照本条”规定的付款方式为融资者各分期付款的退款。其中第X.8包括如下：
The refund guarantees by the Builder to the Buyer shall be indicatedpre-delivery instalments plus interest as aforesaid to the Buyer under orpursuant to paragraph 5 above in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit 'A' whichis yet to be agreed.
事实上，没有形式附于合同，所以很不清楚由刚才引述文章X.8第一款的句子到底是什么意思。Clarke勋爵认为在他看来，它留给双方当事人的是依最终的债券形式同意赔偿与第二次及以后分期款。此外债券发行人的两个身份和债券的形式均是可以接受的方式向买家融资。这是由在第11段引述以上第X.8第二款明确。Clarke勋爵他会接受买家代表律师提出的主张，无论是第X.5条还是第X.8旨在列出所有在退款保证应该操作的情况，这是明显的。例如，在第X.8下合同退还实际或推定全损的情况下支付的分期付款与第X.6 条船厂的义务并没有交叉引用，虽然这是共同点，债券涵盖了该义务。总之，第X.8条并不试图决定债券的最终范围。特别是，它并不要求担保应只限在第X.5条和合同的第X.6退款义务。
Clarke勋爵认为债券第[2]段落尚有一奇怪的地方。在合同项下描述买家的权利，它不限制退还交船前的分期付款。据他们扩展到买家有权“买家用品的价值交给造船厂（如果有的话）”的情况下，虽然在这样做时未能准确地反映有关终止合同的立场，而不是总损失，因为根据合同第V.5条对终止义务是返还所供的物料，只有在已经用于造船之后的才需退还。这似乎从第[2]中定义下对银行的义务范围的银行所提交如下第[3]段描述的是，“all such sums due to you under theContract”既包括了第[2]段下退还的责任，也包含了必须支付买家所供物料的价值。不管这是否可能包括该义务，这的确是在银行在上诉法庭辩论意见梗概所提交的。不过，任何一方都不再提出这样的意见。这是毫无疑问的，因为它的难点在于债券被描述为“预付款债券”和每张债券的金额为26,640,000美元，这价格是第二次及以后的分期付款的总金额。利息仅在债券第[3]段下从买家分期付款的相应日期起支付，从而没有任何权利要求支付债券下的买家所供物品的价值。
SimonBrown爵士对于Patten勋爵及Thorpe LJJ法官对于债券至关重要的条款的解释有不同看法。他正在考虑法官在特定情况下是否应该顾及商业和商业常识，在第28段判决书中他说道：但是是否如Philipps所声称的，在本案中法官的做法已经比较受限制？我不这么认为。作为一个整体第X条的标题是‘付款Payment’，但它包含了不同的条款的分类。第X.8条是起草的基础上，各方预期将附于该协议保证的形式。这将是一个文件，看看是否试图从合同中发现买方正在寻找什么，而不是参考第X.5条。该参考背后起草得非常草率，并完全能够简单地提到第5款的开头一句。这很难以这样的方式来解释，限制了债券所涵盖的退款义务，不仅仅是因为并没有提及第X.6条的退款义务，船舶全损或建造损失，而这是双方同意的，债券涵盖了此损失。由于同样的原因，没有意义应附到第XII.3条省略的退款义务。我也不认为这是Philipps的另外一点东西。关于第XII条第三款事件的发生，买家有权要求立即退还其预付款。如果没有发生合同在不稳定状态：任何一方都不得在这种情况下终止合同。如果船厂不从船舶的建造出发，极端情况如它已经破产，买家只能在90天后加14天通知，按第XII.l延迟所规定的来终止合同。只有这样能引用债券条款。我看不出任何买家（或其金融家）在船厂无力偿债或差不多的情况下，会对此感到满意。
But should thejudge's approach in this case have been more restricted as Mr Philippscontends? I do not think so. The title to Article X as a whole is"Payment" but it contains an assortment of different terms. ArticleX.8 is drafted on the basis that the form of guarantee which the partiescontemplated would be annexed to the agreement. That would be the document tolook at if one was trying to discover from the contract what the Buyer waslooking for, not the reference back to Article X.5. This reference back ispoorly drafted and quite capable of referring simply to the opening sentence ofparagraph 5. It is difficult to construe it in a way which restricts the refundobligations which the bond was to cover, not least because there is noreference to the Article X.6 obligation to a refund following total orconstructive loss of the vessel which both parties agree was to be covered bythe bond. By the same token, no significance should be attached to the omissionof the Article XII.3 refund obligation. Nor do I think there is anything in MrPhilipps' further point. On the happening of an Article XII.3 event the Buyerwas entitled to a refund of its advance payments 'immediately'. If that did not happen the contract was in a stateof limbo: neither party could terminate at that stage. If the Builder did notproceed with the construction of the vessel, as would be extremely likely if itwas insolvent, the Buyer could terminate for delay under Article XII.l but,under the terms of this article, only after 90 days plus 14 days notice. Onlythen could it call on the Bond. I cannot see how any Buyer (or its financiers)could possibly be satisfied with this as a remedy in the situation where theBuilder was insolvent or nearly so.
Clarke勋爵同意Simon Tuckey爵士该观点，较上诉法院多数人的意见更倾向他的解释。
在所有这些情况下，基于对第[2]段列明债券下的到期款项解释的困难性，Clarke勋爵认为如果他只专注于该条款的语言，较银行的解释他会倾向于接受买家的解释。Clarke勋爵在这方面注意到银行的解释是一个事后可有可无的想法。然而，Clarke勋爵意识到，对于买家的解释，完全不容易看出为什么第[2]段列入债券；但银行的解释是值得商榷的。因此，在这种情况下，Clarke勋爵认为他之前提到当局提到的那种情况的一个很好的例子。既然第[3]段的措词有两种含义，法院应该注意到商业合理性的考虑，以解决合理的人理解当事人意图的问题，这是适当的。
Since the language of paragraph [3] is capable of two meanings it is appropriate for the court tohave regard to considerations of commercial common sense in resolving the question what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant.
正如上文第17段所指出的，在他的第18段（iii）法官形容银行关于债券的解释，这就是他所谓出人意料和非符合常规的，如果发生该事项，买家将无法引用债券，即船厂破产了，将很可能需要提供一流的担保。Clarke勋爵同意Simon Tuckey爵士的观点，上诉法院有权考虑事实，商事法院一个富有经验的商事法官所做的判决。在任何情况下，Simon Tuckey都表达了强烈的观点，在第30段判决所陈述的观点基本上与此是相同的：
On the Bank's construction the Bonds covered each of the situations in which the Buyers wereentitled to a return or refund of the advance payments which they had madeunder the contracts apart from the insolvency of the Builder. No credible commercial reason has been advanced as to why the parties (or the Buyers'financiers) should have agreed to this. On the contrary, it makes no commercialsense. As the judge said, insolvency of the Builder was the situation for whichthe security of an advance payment bond was most likely to be needed. The importance attached in these contracts to the obligation to refund in the eventof insolvency can be seen from the fact that they required the refund to bemade immediately. It defies commercial common sense to think that this, amongall other such obligations, was the only one which the parties intended shouldnot be secured. Had the parties intended this surprising result I would haveexpected the contracts and the bonds to have spelt this out clearly but they donot do so.
对银行的解释债券涵盖每种情况，除了船厂破产，买家有权要求退回或退还依合同所提前支付的款项。没有可信的商业理由被提及为什么双方（或买方的融资人）应该同意这一点。相反，它没有任何商业意义。正如法官所说的，船厂的破产，最可能需要预付款债券担保的情况。这些附着在合同下一旦发生破产退款义务的重要性可以从他们要求立即退款的事实上看出。它违反商业常识，认为这是所有其他义务之中唯一双方不能得到保障的。如果双方预期这个令人惊讶的结果，我预计合同和债券已经明确地阐明了这一点，但他们并没有这样做。
Clarke勋爵同意Simon Tuckey爵士此说法。
Patten勋爵相反的观点，在第51段作了如下总结：对于我所提出的理由，我不认为第（3）段的替代解释在这项上诉方面是以均匀平衡的方式提出的。我也同意Philipps所说的，在债券破产的情况下，揣测省略偿还的理由是不允许的。虽然法官说涵盖这样的事情，客观地讲是理想的，但这是不可取的，但这本身就不足以证明偏离自然而明显的债券结构的理由。船厂无法或不愿意在其破产的情况下提供银行担保的原因可能有多种，但为什么买家准备承担此风险。这不是一个这样的情况，在这种情况下，所提出的解释将产生一种荒谬的或不合理的结果，我所提到的情况是描述的，只是说对于债券的有限范围没有提出可信的商业理由。在我看来，使我们有真正的危险，将我们自己对交易的商业性的判断取代为实际交易的人。
For the reasons which I have given, I do not regard the alternative constructions of paragraph(3) advanced on this appeal as being in any way evenly balanced. I also agreewith Mr Philipps that it is impermissible to speculate on the reasons foromitting repayments in the event of insolvency from the bond. Although the judge is right to say that cover for such event was, objectively speaking,desirable, that is not sufficient in itself to justify a departure from what would otherwise be the natural and obvious construction of the bond. There maybe any number of reasons why the Builder was unable or unwilling to providebank cover in the event of its insolvency and why the Buyer was prepared totake the risk. This is not a case in which the construction contended for wouldproduce an absurd or irrational result in the sense described in the cases Ihave referred to and merely to say that no credible commercial reason has beenadvanced for the limited scope of the bond does, in my view, put us in realdanger of substituting our own judgment of the commerciality of the transactionfor that of those who were actually party to it.
如Hoffmann勋爵所说的那样，引援了Diplock勋爵在The Antaios案中所作的陈词，如果语言能够有多于一种的解释，没有必要得出结论，在考虑到所同意的商业目的之前，特定的解释将产生荒谬或不合理的结果。
If the languageis capable of more than one construction, it is not necessary to conclude thata particular construction would produce an absurd or irrational result beforehaving regard to the commercial purpose of the agreement.
如，Hoffmann勋爵所说的：
But language isa very flexible instrument and, if it is capable of more than one construction,one chooses that which seems most likely to give effect to the commercialpurpose of the agreement.
但是，语言是一种非常灵活的工具，如果它能够有一种以上的解释，则选择似乎最有可能实现协议的商业目的的语言。
另参Longmore勋爵所说，如前文所引用的：
It is quite possible that neither meaningwill flout common sense. In such circumstances, it is much more appropriate toadopt the more, rather than the less, commercial construction.
很有可能，这两种解释都不会违背商业合理性。在这种情况下，采用更多而不是较少的商业解释将更为合适。
在第51段，Patten勋爵似乎已经接受，银行所提出的债券的涵盖范围有限并没有可信的商业理由。Pillips主张，银行没有必要的来解决这个问题。Clarke勋爵认为他毫不怀疑，如果他或银行已经能够想到的可信理由在船厂破产的情况下排除还款，这样的理由银行会将其摆在前列。
在这些情况下，Clarke勋爵认为，如果有必要，省略了在债券下重新付款的责任义务将违背常识，但没有必要这么说。他同意法官与Simon Tuckey所说，债券第[3]有两种有争议的解释，买家的解释是优先考虑的，因为此解释与商业目的一致，但银行的解释并没有。
In these circumstances I would, if necessary, go so far as to say that theomission of the obligation to make such re-payments from the Bonds would floutcommon sense but it is not necessary to go so far. I agree with the Judge andSir Simon Tuckey that, of the two arguable constructions of paragraph [3] ofthe Bonds, the Buyers' construction is to be preferred because it is consistentwith the commercial purpose of the Bonds in a way in which the Bank'sconstruction is not.
总结：
本案的争议如之前所介绍的，主要是涉及与造船合同有关的银行担保的范围。如果船舶没有交付，担保包括偿还某些预先分期付款的价格，但是涉及哪些类型的预付款项涉及到的争议。银行认为并非所有的垫款均已涵盖，上诉法院接受了这一抗辩，上诉院他们的理由是，虽然没有明显的商业理由，为什么买家应该准备接受预付款的全额担保，但这个结果既不荒谬也非不合理，从合同表明上看这就是他们所同意的。对于上诉法院大多数人法官的判决，Patten勋爵指出，如果采纳其它观点，他们会真正有可能将法官他们自己对交易的商业性合理性的判断取代为当事人的实际意图的危险。
但最高法院推翻了上诉院的判决，其理由是：没有必要证明合同的表面含义是荒谬的或不合理的，只要没有合理的原因来解释保函的金额少于预付款的全额就足够了。Clarke勋爵在他的判决中强调，目的是为了理解而非推翻合同语言，如果一个条款的解读会得出多于一种的解释，那么将采纳更具有商业合理性的解释。
作为合约的恰当解释，当事人双方所签订的合约内的措辞，应该依据上下文作为一个整体来解读，如Sumption勋爵所说的，这是唯一可以采纳的能够证明当事人双方真正意图的直接证据。合约的起草者，赋予每个措辞其自身意义。虽然在本案中，Clarke勋爵所做的判决，似乎看起来有悖合约的本意，但是如Clarke指出的，一条款的解读有多于一种解释，那么法官将采纳更具商业合理性的解释，这并不违背英国法一贯以来的稳定性和持续性。
但如果合约的措辞足够清晰明确，那么法官就越不可能作出相反的解释。因此，本案对于造船合同方面，尤其是在债券，退款保证的条款中的措辞使用会起很好的警示作用。在拟定此类条款的时候，使用的措辞应该更加清晰明确，避免出现任何可能有两种解释，导致对条款的不同解读的情况发生。
海运圈聚焦专栏作者 Alex （微信公众号 航运佬）
