2018-05-15
1626 
【摘要】在航运实践中，一个从事航运的合理的商业人士，应该都清楚如果在租约中加了WOG这个措辞，即意味着对所作的描述或相应的条款不保证，不承担合同义务。但事实是否如此呢？本文结合一下判例来说明这方面的问题。
【关键词】WOG、误述、违约、索赔
去年笔者曾写过一篇《船舶错过销约期租家是否可以索赔损失》的文章，但因涉及未决的争议，按人家要求删掉了。在那个争议中，不管是出租人协会的律师还是承租人协会的律师，都认为出租人错过销约期，无需承担责任。律师们认为，合同中关于船舶动态方面，已经加了IFAW WOG WP，所以承租人无需承担任何责任。当然，笔者在那篇文章中，持反对意见。有眼明手快的律师朋友在那篇文中留言，问我是否考虑到WOG这个措辞，如果考虑了是否会改变观点。笔者到现在依然认为，不会改变任何观点，纵然加了WOG，出租人仍得承担违约责任。
现在简单再来看一下，合同保证部分，如下：
- OWS TO CONFIRM:
-VESSEL IS AND WILL BE IN A SEAWORTHY CONDITION AT ALL/ANY TIMETHROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF THIS CHARTER PARTY.
-VESSEL TO BE FULLY COMPLIANTWITH ALL ITF REQUIREMENTS WITH REGARD TO EMPLOYMENT OF CREW AND OWNERS TO HAVEALL RELEVANT AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION CONFIRMING SAME.
-VESSEL TO BE CLASSED LLOYDS100+ A1 OR EQUIVALENT AND FULLY COVERED BY P&I CLUB , WHICH IS TO BE AMEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF P&I CLUBS.-OWNERS CONFIRM VESSELWILL NOT CHANGE NAME/FLAG/CLASS/OWNERSHIP OR P&I CLUB WHILE PERFORMING THISVOYAGE.
-THE LAST PSC INSPECTIONS(OVER THE PAST YEARS) ARE NOT SHOWING DEFICIENCIES WHICH MAY HAVE ANY IMPACT ONTHE CARGO / SEAWORTHINESS OF THE VESSEL.
PLEASE ADIVSE:
-VSLS FULL / DETAILEDITINERARY: VSL SAILING WITH 14KTS ETA COGH18TH JUL IFAGW WOG WP ETA PARA 28TH JUL IFAGWWOG WP
首先，保证的第一部分，throughtout theduration措辞构成了出租人的持续性保证。Please advise，是承租人要求出租人对船舶的动态作出陈述。而出租人作出的陈述为：船舶以14节速度航行，如果一切顺利，不保证，天气许可的情况下预计7月18日抵达好望角，如果一切顺利，不保证，天气许可的情况下预计7月28日抵达Paranagua。
该陈述似乎加了WOG，出租人无需承担任何ETA不准所带来的责任问题。笔者在那篇文章中认为，出租人在这方面所作出的陈述，并不真诚，而且没有合理的根据，因此纵然加了WOG，仍然得为违约负责。很显然，对于一艘并不年轻的船，还以全速满负荷的速度14节来计算ETA，这不符逻辑很不正常；其次，在横跨印度洋和大西洋，途中过好望角，出租人全然不考虑航行途中可能遭遇的恶劣天气的影响，仍然以14节的速度来计算，从而给出预计28日就抵达装港的错误陈述，因此该陈述没有合理根据，纵然加了WOG，依然得承担责任。
在那个争议案中，还涉及出租人其它方面的多个违约。违约无关程度大小，一旦违约，无辜的另一方即有权索赔损失。
现在来结合一些先例，来看WOG的法律效力问题。
一、JAPY FRERES &CO. v. R. W. J. SUTHERLAND & CO.; R. W. J.
SUTHERLAND & CO. v. OWNERS OF THE "THOGER." 案
在这个案子中，出租人将The “Thoger”轮租给承租人，合同中有关于船舶的描述，“supposed to carry about 600tons- but no guarantee”。承租人又将该轮转租，船舶的描述为，“carrying about 600 tons deadweight…without guarantee”。
但实际上，载重量相对较少，承租人认为出租人违约，找出租人索赔损害赔偿。
上诉法院的Bankes勋爵认为，在本案中，涉及的是一艘非常古老的船舶，在她的职业生涯中，有相当数量的水泥作为永久性压载物放置在她的底部。仲裁员已经查证发现的，水泥是固定不可移动的，它显然已被放置在船舶中变成了永久性压载物。
这一点，补充一下有关船舶方面的知识。通常情况下，船舶都需要进行压载水作业，比如装货过程中因为空高限制等需要进行压水，装货后排水。卸货的情况相反，卸货过程中要压水，避免空高过高影响卸货。通常情况下，码头水深都较浅，那么在进行压载的时候，就会吸入大量的污浊的海底水，带有泥浆等。久而久之，这些泥浆就沉淀在压载舱中，从而导致装货量减少。如这个案中，因为有水泥，而这些水泥又除不掉，因此导致少装货。
回到本案中来，Bankes勋爵认为在他看来，提到将出租人的整个空间和载货能力置于承租人的处置上的观点取决于参照以其所处方式描述的该操作的真实推论是什么，如仲裁员所描述的。如果真正的推论是它只是船上的一种压舱物，或者是Mackinnon先生风景如画的语言，那么将附着在织物上的外来物质以阻塞的方式放置，如果它仅仅是在我称之为松散压载物的性质中，无论沉重或难以将其移除，可能是承租人有权要求出租人拆除它或抱怨如果它是没有被移除，他们没有得到他们应有的权利，船舶的全部范围和载货能力。但是，尽管它具有永久性压载的性质，但仲裁员已经查证认定的它是固定不可移动的，Bankes 勋爵认为从中可得出的推论是，无论您将它视为船舶结构的一部分，或者您是否认为它是对船舶造成影响的永久性改造，并不重要。它必须完全按照游戏的方式对待，就好像它是船的一部分一样，就像甲板或船的任何其他永久部分一样。如果它被如此看待并且这是真正的抽象推论，不明白Mackinnon先生会否认出租人向承租人提供了船的全部空间和载货能力，因为比原来少装货了，因此货运能力远远低于她最初建造时的货运能力，如果出租人向承租人提供了现有的全部货舱，他们将履行其义务，这仍然属于“租船合同”。Bankes 勋爵认为正如他从事实中得出的结论，Rowlatt法官已经吸引了游戏推理，但Rowlatt法官得出了一个不同的结论。Bankes 勋爵认为他非常尊重Rowlatt法官，但他不能同意Rowlatt法官的结论，因为他的结论是承租人有权追偿，理由是他们无法支配船舶的全部空间和载货能力，如承租人主张，无法使用如船舶建造时全部的空间和载货能力。
But although it was in the nature of permanent ballast, the Arbitrator has found that it was fixed and irremovable, and the inference Idraw from that is that whether you regard it as part of the structure of the vessel from the time it was placed there, or whether you regard it as apermanent alteration of the vessel which had the effect of reducing the cargo space, is immaterial. It must be treated in exactly the game way as if it waspart of the ship, just as much as the deck or any other permanent part of theship. If it is so regarded, and that is the true inference to draw, I do notunderstand that Mr. Mackinnon would dispute that the owners were giving to the charterers the full reach and burden of the ship, because in the instance hegave where a vessel had been shortened, so that the cargo capacity was substantially less than it was at the time she was originally constructed,still in a Charter such as this if the owners gave the charterers the full existing cargo space they would be fulfilling their obligations. Mr. Justice Rowlatt has drawn the game inference as I draw from the facts, but he comes toa different conclusion. With great respect I cannot agree with his conclusion because his conclusion was that the charterers were entitled to recover on the ground that the full reach and burden was not put at their disposal.
因此，Rowlatt法官的意思应该与她最初的构造一致，Bankes 勋爵认为不能同意这是租船合同第8条的真实观点。他认为该条款是指当时船舶所得达到的范围和载货能力，是指当时船舶的永久性特征。第8条考虑到承租人不仅要有全部货物的空间，还要有船的全部装载的能力。在这个意义上，Bankes 勋爵认为同意寻求建立在这个条款上的解释，但他不能同意，如果在这里对船舶进行这样的改造，其效果就像正如Rowlatt法官所说的那样，出租人他如果没有移除这样的永久性变更，他将违反合同。
By that he must mean as she was originally constructed, and Icannot agree that that is the true view of Clause 8 of the Charter-party. Ithink that Clause refers to the reach and burden of the vessel as then existingwith reference to the permanent character of the then construction of the ship.Clause 8 contemplates that the charterer shall have not only the full cargopace, but the full lifting capacity of the ship. To that extent I agree withthe construction sought to be placed on the Clause, but I cannot agree thatwhere such an alteration in the vessel is made as was made here the effect ofit is as Mr. Justice Rowlatt has said, that the shipowner is committing a breachof his contract if he does not remove such a permanent alteration as this.
Bankes 勋爵认为在这种情况下的另一点取决于租船合同所用措辞的解释。在仲裁员面前，有人认为该船的容量有保证。仲裁员已经发现该船的实际能力约为500吨载重吨，据说这艘船使用的措辞的真正解释是保证她的货物载重量为600吨载重吨。Bankes 勋爵认为没有听到任何理由支持这个法院的争论。但同样的观点则以不同的方式提出。据说有一艘船的描述，并且根据仲裁员对最初的租船合同说什么的看法，这艘船的描述是她的载重量约600吨，他发现一艘船500吨载重量和一艘600吨载重量的船舶，以至于使后者在商业上与前者不同。据说由于出租人交付的船舶与租船合同中提及的船舶截然不同，因此承租人和转租的承租人有权以出租人违约为由索赔损害赔偿。这里的租船合同是有名的船舶，因此毫无疑问，租船人和转租承租人得到的是他们得到这艘船的意义。通过参考她的名字在船名的描述中增加了关于她的货运能力的描述文字，问题是在一个案例中的出租人和另一个案件中的承租人是否充分保护自己免受违反保证书中提到该说明。现在，租船合同和分租船合同中使用的语言是不一样的，Bankes 勋爵认为没有听说它表明它们之间存在真正的实质区别。Bankes 勋爵认为，他对这些词的推论是，有一个蒸汽船船名的参考，有关该货轮的货物容量的描述的文字，但是伴随着这些文字的足够简单的陈述，该描述无保证地给出。如果这是真正的解释，那么在他看来，转租承租人和承租人未能以船舶不符合所谓的担保载货能力为由确定诉讼权。出于这些原因，Bankes 勋爵认为，出租人上诉成功了，并且必须搁置判决，根据仲裁员对他刚才提交的案例的看法进行适当的判决。
The other point in this case depends upon the construction of thelanguage used in the Charter-party. Before the Arbitrator it was contended thatthere was a warranty of the capacity of the vessel. The Arbitrator has foundthat the vessel's real capacity was about 500 tons deadweight, and it was saidthe true construction of the language used in reference to this vessel was thatthere was a warranty that her cargo capacity was 600 tons deadweight of cargo.We have heard no argument in support of that contention in this Court. But thesame sort of point is put in a different way. It is said there is a descriptionof the vessel, and the description of this vessel, according to theArbitrator's view of what the original Charter-party said, was that she was about600 tons deadweight, and he found the difference between a vessel of 500 tonsdeadweight capacity and a vessel of 600 tons deadweight capacity so great as tomake the latter commercially a different thing from the former; and it is saidthat because the owners handed over a vessel substantially different from theone referred to in the Charter-party that gives the charterers andsub-charterers a right of action in damages for breach of warranty. Here thecharter is of a named vessel, so there is no doubt the charterers andsub-charterers got what they had contracted to get in the sense that they gotthe very vessel. Added to the description of the vessel by reference to hername there were words of description in reference to her cargo capacity, andthe question is whether the owners in the one case and the charterers in theother sufficiently protected themselves against any action for breach of warranty in reference to that description. Now, the language used in thecharter and sub-charter is not the same, but I have not heard it suggested thatthere is any real substantial difference between them. Speaking for myself, the inference I place onthose words is that there is a reference by name to the steamer; there arewords of description of that steamer having reference to her cargo capacity,but a sufficiently plain statement accompanying these words that that description is given without guarantee. If that is the true construction, it appears to me that the sub-charterers and charterers fail inestablishing a right of action on the ground that the vessel was not of the suggested guaranteed cargo capacity. For these reasons, in my opinion, theappeal succeeds, and the judgment must be set aside and the proper judgment entered according to the findings of the Arbitrator on the view of the case Ihave just presented.
Scrutton勋爵在判决中说到，我只能看到她可以载运600吨但“不保证”的声明，拒绝依合同她实际承运600吨货物，将有权索赔损害赔偿如果她未能载运这些货物的权利。因此没有必要作出判定，但我自己本来应该认为这是一种表述，其真实性会使对方撤销发现不真实的合同。如果试图将其视为合同的一个条款，违反该条款给予损害赔偿的权利，那么我认为“不保证”一词排除了任何索赔。
I can only read the statement that she could carry 600 tons "without guarantee" as beinga refusal to contract that she shall actually carry 600 tons and that there shall be a right to claim damages if she does not. . . It is not necessary to decide it, but I myself should have been disposed to think that this was are presentation the untruth of which would enable the other party to rescind the contract on discovering the untruth. . . If it is attempted to treat it as aterm of the contract the breach of which gives a right to damages then I think the words "without guarantee" preclude any claim .
Atkin勋爵表示同意，出租人上诉成功，无需承担任何损害赔偿。
二、BenshipInternational Inc. v. Deemand Shipping Co. S.A案
本案未公开报告，涉及的是一航次期租合同，期租合同规定：
. . .One time charter trip. . .about 40/120 days duration without guarantee.
在装港的时候，由于装货困难，在装了一部分货后，承租人最终选择了把船上的货物卸下，然后直接还船给出租人。出租人认为，按合同，承租人有责任义务使航次保持至少约40/120天，并且“不保证”一词将合同条款中的条件改为保证，只允许索赔损失。但法官Leggatt认为，该条款甚至不是保证条款，仅仅是：
一项表示承租人有义务真诚地做出他们对航次期限的估计。
再次，没有迹象表明任何争论都向法官提出，“不保证”一词将义务的绝对性降低为不是疏忽地计算航次期限的义务。尽管如此，博学的法官明确表示，无论义务是什么，它只不过是作出估计需真诚。
Mr.Justice Leggatt held that the clause was not even a warranty and only -
. . .arepresentation placing the charterer under an obligation to make in good faith their estimate of the duration of the trip.
Again there is no sign that any argument was addressed to the Judge that the words"without guarantee" reduced the absolute nature of the obligation to an obligation not negligentlyto calculate the duration of the trip. Nevertheless there is a clear statementfrom that learned Judge that, whatever the obligation is, it is no more than to make an estimate in good faith.
在本案中，法官Leggatt特别强调了，所做的估计需是真诚的。承租人在WOG下，想免责的前提是，所做的估计需是真诚善意的。
二、Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd. v. Deemand ShippingCo. Ltd.（The
Lendoudis Evangelos II ）[1997]1 Lloyd’s Rep.404案
在本案中，Deemand Shipping Co. Ltd.（本案出租人）在1989 年10 月18 日于Continental Pacific ShippingLtd.（本案承租人）为其船舶Lendoudis EvangelosII 签订了一份航次期租合同，其中租约期约定如下：
…duration about 70/80 days without guarantee…
即，租期大约70 到80天，不保证。
但是实际上整个航次用了103天12 小时40分钟，出租人于是以出租人错误的延迟还船向承租人提出索赔，最终争议诉诸仲裁。出租人主张，前述的“duration about 70/80 dayswithout guarantee”是承租人所承诺的，是基于善意和合理根据对航次长短的估计。出租人并未宣称承租人上述的估计是恶意的，而只是声称承租人所作的估计存在过失。但承租人声称，“without guarantee”该措辞即意味着他们并无合同义务，对于所估计的租期只要是善意作出即可。
Owners contended that the words quoted above were a term of the contract constituting an estimate of the length of the trip which charterers promised was made in good faith and on reasonable grounds. They did not allegethat the estimate was made in bad faith but did allege that the estimate was negligently made. Charterers alleged that the words "withoutguarantee" meant that there was no commitment on their part, save that theestimate of duration in the charter had to be made in good faith. Since no allegation of bad faith was made, they argued that they should succeed.
仲裁员裁定认为，善意的标准是承租人对70/80天租期的原始估计是否合理。 这不是一个容易理解的结论，因为它似乎忽略了两种可能的但是独立的标准来估计出租租船合同的持续时间。然而，仲裁员详细的调查结果表明，承租人没有合理根据来做出他们所做的估计。因此，仲裁员裁定承租人败诉，得赔偿出租人损害赔偿。承租人不服裁决提出上诉。
The arbitrator concluded that the test of good faith was whether the charterers' original estimate of 70/80 days was made reasonably at the time of fixing. This is not an easy conclusion to understand because it appears toelide the two possible but separate tests for an estimate of the duration ofthe trip charter. His detailed findings amount, however, to a conclusion thatthe charterers had no reasonable ground for making the estimate that they did.On that basis he awarded damages against the charterers.
Langley法官就以下法律问题准许承租人上诉。
Whether on a true construction of the charterparty between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and as a matter of law, the words "durationabout 70/80 days without guarantee" amounted to an estimate by the Plaintiffs of the likely duration of the charterparty, actionable and/or amounting to a misrepresentation:
(i) only in the event that such estimate was not given in good faith; or
(ii) in the event that such estimate was not a reasonable estimate and/or was not given on a reasonable basis.
承租人的代表律师认为，根据租船合同的真实解释，70/80天的估计只有在没有善意给出的情况下才可采取诉讼，而出租人的代表律师争辩说，尽管有“without guarantee”的字样，但如果不是以合理根据提出的，估计是可以采取诉讼的。
出租人的代表律师请求Longmore法官假定“without guarantee”这个词不存在，并认为在这种情况下，在最多80天内完成航次是绝对有义务的，加上适当的余量可归因于改为“约”字（仲裁员在此认定为10％，即8天）。他表示，“不保证”一词用于排除义务的绝对性质，并减少了在作出估计时使用适当谨慎义务的义务。根据这一观点，仲裁员的查证结果（承租人没有使用过这种适当的谨慎）是相关的，不容置疑的，因此裁决应得到维护。
Longmore法官认为，Langley法官所提出的法律问题并非完全没有权威，引援了上文所说的Japy Frères andCo. v. Sutherland & Co., (1921) 6Ll.L.Rep. 381案。
The question of law posed by Mr. Justice Langley is not entirelyfree of authority. In Japy Frères andCo. v. Sutherland & Co., (1921) 6 Ll.L.Rep. 381; (1921) 26 Com.Cas.227 owners had chartered their vessel Thoeger" supposed to carry about 600 tons - but no guarantee given." Asub-charter described the vessel as "carrying about 600 tons deadweight. ..without guarantee". In fact the deadweight capacity was considerably lessand charterers claimed damages for breach. The Court of Appeal held unanimously that no action would lie. Lord Justice Scrutton said:
I can only read the statement that she could carry 600 tons "without guarantee" as being a refusal to contract that she shall actually carry 600 tons and that there shall be a right to claim damages if shedoes not. . . It is not necessary to decide it, but I myself should have beendisposed to think that this was a representation the untruth of which would enable the other party to rescind the contract on discovering the untruth. . .If it is attempted to treat it as a term of the contract the breach of which gives a right to damages then I think the words "without guarantee" preclude any claim . . .
Longmore法官认为似乎没有任何理由向法院提出这样的言论，即将绝对义务减少为不疏忽的义务，并引援了BenshipInternational Inc. v. Deemand Shipping Co. S.A.案。
出租人的代表律师请Longmore法官不要做出这样的判决，并提出承租人对航次期限的估算应该与在程租合同下出租人预计船舶准备就绪可装货一致。普遍的理由是出租人的任何此类陈述必须以善意和合理根据作出，参见Sanday&Co.v. KeighleyMaxted＆Co.，（1922）10 Ll.L.Rep.738；（1922）27 Com.Cas.296案和Mihalis Angelos，[1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep.43;[1971] 1 Q.B. 164案。Longmore法官认为这种方法的困难在于“无保证”这个词仍然有待解释。如前所述，出租人的代表律师试图通过说这些话只排除义务的绝对性质来解决这个问题。
Longmore法官认为在这里陷入困境。如果对持续时间的估计是真诚和合理根据的估计，则“无保证”一词必须排除该义务的合理方面，因为除此之外没有别的可排除的；另一方面，如果持续时间的义务是绝对的，那么由于“无保证”的字样，没有权威来解释义务。Longmore法官认为正如Leggatt法官所判定的，这项义务本身就被排除在外。Longmore法官认为没有理由背离Leggatt法官的判决，一切理由都应遵循他的判决。
仲裁员声称遵循法官Leggatt法官的判决。Longmore法官认为正如他已经说过的那样，仲裁员的13段裁决的结果是，善意标准是承租人的原始估计是否合理。Longmore法官认为这根本不是善意的标准。如果他要自己制定一个善意标准，那么他要说的是，所有这些要求是，承租人在确定航次时真的相信这次航次将持续70到80天。既然从来没有人声称他们没有真正相信他们的估计，他们必须承认他们不会对出租人负责。
最终，Longmore法官判，承租人上诉将被允许。相关的法律问题将回答如下：（i）是（ii）否。仲裁员的裁决必须更改并取代。
Owners are in a dilemma here. If the estimate as to duration is anestimate to be made in good faith and on reasonable grounds, the words"without guarantee" mustexclude the reasonable aspect of that obligation because there is nothing elseto exclude; if, on the other hand, the obligation as to duration is absolutethere is no authority to construe the obligation differently as a result of thewords "without guarantee"; the obligation is itself excluded as Mr.Justice Leggatt has held. I see no good reason to depart from the decision of Mr.Justice Leggatt and every reason to follow it.
The arbitrator purported to follow the decision of Mr. JusticeLeggatt in par. 13 of his award but then, as I have already said, concludedthat the test of good faith was whether the charterers' original estimate was reasonablymade. That is not the test of good faith at all. If I were to formulate a testof good faith myself, I would say that all it requires is that the charterersgenuinely believed at the time of fixing that the trip would last between 70and 80 days. Since it was never alleged that they did not have a genuine beliefin their estimate, it must follow that they cannot be liable to the owners. Theappeal will be allowed; the question of law will be answered as follows: (i)Yes (ii) No. The award must be varied and replaced.
四、Losinjska Plovidba Brodarstovo DD v. Valfracht Maritime Co. Ltd and Another ( The “Lipa”) [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.17案
本案是根据1996年的“仲裁法”第69条所提出的上诉，涉及Baltime格式的租船合同上增设条款的解释问题。
Losinjska PlovidbaBrodarstovo DD（本案出租人）在1993年9月8日与Valfracht Maritime Co. Ltd（本案承租人）以Baltime格式签订的合同。Lipa轮在1993年9月8日至12日之间交付的，最初的租船合同期限为3至6个月，但是它曾多次延期，船最终于1998年12月29日还船。
争议的焦点问题是，租船合约方是否包含关于该船的燃料消耗的保证。承租人抱怨说，如果违反保证，其消耗了过量的燃料。租船合同约定争议适用伦敦仲裁，双方之间就租船合同的争议提交给仲裁员Timothy Rayment和George Lugg。所提及的对租船合同的解释问题被确定为一个初步问题，仲裁员就2000年7月12日的问题发布了临时最终裁决。
Baltime格式，专栏3中提到的当事方同意作为方框5中指定的船舶的出租人，方框6中所示的毛/净注册吨位（如方框7所述）以及方框8中所述的所示马力，方框9中所标明的夏季载重吨，包括数量，包括燃油舱，备品，伙食和锅炉用水，根据船厂的计划，具有谷物包装立方英尺，方格10所述的包装容积，不包括永久性燃油，其中包含了方框11中规定的吨数，满载时能够在方格12中所述的在良好的天气和平稳的水中，消耗大约如方框12中所示的节数，如框13中所述的当前的船位置，以及在框4中作为承租人提到的当事方如下。然后列出通常的印刷和编号条款，并修改和删除。
表格第12栏在印有“以吨（abt）的消耗吨数（abt）”字样，“节”（abt）字样，“见第26条”等印刷文字之后完成。在租船合同的开头语中提到的其他方框也类似地完成：方框6,7,9,10和11。方框8留空，方框3,4和5填写出租人，承租人和船舶的名称（连同出租人和承租人的营业地点）。方框13填写了“Trading”一词。
租船合同第26条是用“船舶描述”一语引入的分类条款。随后的两页打字稿列出了船舶的详细资料，包括船名，船旗国和二船东名，以及（例如）“装备电传”，“装备船艏推进器”，主机细节，货物容量和货物处理设备（例如，在露天甲板应该有20吨门式起重机）。有关本案中承租人所依赖的燃油消耗的措辞如下：
speed/consumption in goodweather/calm sea, wind not exceeding Beaufort scale 4, on even keel
-about 11 knots on about 14mt IFO (180 cst) + about 1.5 mt Gasoil.
-about 12 knots on about 17.5mt IFO (180 cst) + about 1.5 mt Gasoil
-about 14 knots on about 21mt IFO (180 cst) + about 1.5 mt Gasoil
-about 16 knots on about 33mt IFO (180 cst) + about 1.5 mt Gasoil
In case carrying reefercontainers Gasoil consumption increases to about 2.1 mt.
Port consumption:
-working about 2.4 mt Gasoil
-idle about 1.5 mt Gasoil
需要注意的是，第26条条款中包含了船舶各方面的许多规定，但是只有那些关于速度和油耗的内容才包含“about”的措辞。
在第26条最后面结束的时候，有一个重要的段落，“All details about-alldetails given in good faith but without guarantee”。
即所有细节都是大约的-所有细节都是善意真诚地给出，但不保证。这是出租人的观点，因为这些措辞不能保证在第26条中列出的事项，或至少没有对船舶的燃油消耗给予保证。
仲裁员不接受这一论点。他们的理由是必须对第26条的结束语给出一个含义。该条不仅适用于燃油消耗，而且适用于该条款中的所有其他项目。
The arbitrators did not accept this contention. They proceeded on the basis that a meaning had to be given to the closing words of cl. 26 whichapplied not only to the consumption of fuel but to all other items in theclause as well.
仲裁员认为，他们并不相信这些文字将第26条中的所有承诺都删除了，例如，如果船舶没有配备船艏推进器或者龙门起重机只能起吊5吨，那么情况会是怎样。因此仲裁员裁定，虽然“无保证”一词阻止了出租人的绝对保证，但他们并没有将出租人的所有义务移除，如果这么做会违背常识和商业有效性。
然后，仲裁员试图说出一些含义，并裁定：“就燃油消耗保证而言，应该考虑给他们提供额外的余量，引入about所需给予的余量'”。因此他们认为，他们会允许百分之五。但由于有“不保证”一词，因此应给予为百分之十的燃油消耗的富余量。
The arbitrators concluded that:
Although the words "without guarantee" prevented the Owners from being held to an absolute warranty, they did not remove allobligations from the Owners shoulders. To do so would have run counter to common sense and business efficacy.
They then sought to give the words some meaning and concluded that "so far as concerned the consumption warranties, they should be taken togive an additional allowance over and above that imported by about' ".They therefore held that, whereas otherwise they would have allowed a five percent. margin on warranted consumption, because of the words "without guarantee" a 10 per cent. margin should be allowed.
出租人的代表律师认为，仲裁员的这种推理与权威不一致，并且没有对合同第26条的最后几个字给出适当的效果。他辩称，“不保证”一语的效果是，它们规定，它们适用的条款不是保证的。此外，与“真诚地提供所有细节”一词相结合的措词的效果是，在不存在不诚实行为的情况下不能以此为依据。但这在本案中并未涉及。
Mr. Mark Smith, who appears before me for the owners, submits that this reasoning is inconsistent withauthority and does not give proper effect to the last words of cl. 26. Heargues that the effect of the words "without guarantee" is that they stipulate that a provision to which they apply is not a warranty. Moreover, theeffect of the words coupled with the words "all details given in good faith" is that no claim can be based upon them in the absence of mala fides, which is not alleged in this case.
商事法院的Adnrew Smith法官认为尽管仲裁员有理由，但他认为出租人代表律师的论点的第一阶段无疑是正确的。很明显，如果并且就租船合同中的条款而言，以“不担保”的字样来限定，则该条款不是保证。如果需要权威来支持这一点，可以参阅Japy Freres v.Sutherland（1921）26 Com.CAS.227案，以及ContinentalPacific Shipping Ltd.v. Deemand Shipping Co. Ltd. [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep.404案。Adnrew Smith法官认为在这种情况下更困难的问题是第26条最后的规定是否适用于租船合约方关于燃油消耗的规定（或更确切地说，关于船舶不在港口时的消耗）。
I consider, despite the reasoning of the arbitrators, that the first stage of Mr. Smith's argument is undoubtedly correct. It is clear that if and in so far as a provision in the charter-partyis qualified by the words "without guarantee" the provision is not awarranty. If authority be needed to support this, it is found in Japy Freres v.Sutherland, (1921) 26 Com. Cas. 227, and in Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd.v. Deemand Shipping Co. Ltd., [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 404. The more difficult question in this case is whether thequalification at the end of cl. 26 applies to the provisions in thecharter-party about consumption (or more precisely about consumption when thevessel was not in port).
出租人的代表律师的主要意见是，这些文字限定了船舶在合同第26条中列出的所有细节。对这种解释可能提出的反对意见是，“alldetails about”的措辞不适用于该条款的所有规定，例如“配备电传”和“装备了船艏推进器装置”的规定。承租人的代表律师主张，最后一段中的“details”一词在“all details about”的短语中使用时指的是不同的规定，并且当用于“alldetails given in good faith but without guarantee”,诚实但不保证地给予；这表明“不保证”一词并不涉及整个第26条。出租人的代表律师称，该条款的最后一句话适用于所有条款，因为它们是恰当的：它并不遵循，因为“details”不容易被“about”这个词限定，它是不容易接受剩余的资格。
然而，出租人的代表律师对于该条款最后一段的解释有次要意见。Adnrew Smith法官认为如果是这样的话，由于他提到的原因，限定词不适用于合同第26条的所有条款。尽管如此，他们的确提到了所有可以通过“about”这个词适当限定的条款，他认为这些条款都是具有估计意义的规定，并且能够具有更高或更低的描述准确性。这足以达到他的目的，因为关于燃油消耗的规定显然适合用“about”来限定，因此给予一定的余量界限：例如，参见Al Bida，[1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep.124案。Adnrew Smith法官认为实际上，正如他所观察到的，唯一的条款在第26条中由“about”字个别限定的是燃油和消耗规定。
Adnrew Smith法官认为在他提出承租人代表律师的提议之前，他应该提一下，在他看来，对于最后一段的第三种可能的解释是在第26条中，有可能将这些词语解释为规定，在详细说明为“about”的情况下，该船舶的部分描述是善意提供的，但没有保证。这当然意味着燃油消耗条款是在这个基础上给出的。 这种解释可以解释为什么“about”一词出现在该条款最后一段的引号中，唯一的另一种解释表明，合同起草人是（非特征地）意识到不合语法的用法。这也是对该条款的解释，与出租人代表律师认为的解释不同，这意味着在关于速度和燃油消耗的规定中反复使用“about”一词并不是过剩的。
Before I set out Mr. Cooke's submission, I should mention that it seemsto me that there is a third possible interpretation of the last paragraph incl. 26. It is possible to interpret the words as providing that whereparticulars are specified to be "about", that part of the descriptionof the vessel is given in good faith but without guarantee. This would ofcourse mean that the consumption provisions are given on this basis. Thisinterpretation would explain why the word "about" appears in invertedcommas in the last paragraph of the clause the only other explanation suggestedbeing that the draftsman of the contract was (uncharacteristically) consciousof an ungrammatical usage. It is also an interpretation of the clause which,unlike the interpretations for which Mr. Smith contends, means that therecurrent use of the word "about" in the provisions dealing with speed and fuel consumption is not surplusage.
承租人的代表律师的提交没有以合同第26条作为起点。他从“序言”开始，指出序言中的陈述在没有有效资格的情况下应视为合同条款。为了支持这个论点，他引用了Lorentzen v.White（1943）74 Ll.L.Rep.161案和The Apollonius，[1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep.53案。序言规定了船舶能够在租船合同重载情况下能满足方框12中所示节数，条款描述为“关于最佳燃油消耗吨数在专栏12中陈述”。
专栏12说的是参考第26条，正如承租人代表律师所指出的那样，应被认为是指速度条款和相应的燃油条款。他提出，没有任何理由将方框12解释为指的是第26条中的这些规定；并且特别没有理由理解第12条是将该资格纳入最后一段。为了支持这一论点，他提请注意使用“details”一词，并提出这样的说法并不适合用于表示船舶描述的一部分，这部分描述足以通过一个方框引入，在“序言”中的船舶描述。
承租人的代表律师还提出了另外三件意见，以支持他的论点，即第26条的最后一段，不应该给予如此强有力的解释，以便通过方框来渗透序言。首先，他认为，至少在据说第26条条款适用的范围内。在方框中援用，最后一款依赖于例外条款或豁免条款，因此应予以坚决解释。其次，他强烈要求对出租人代表律师倡导的最后一段产生如此广泛的影响的解释将会使租船合同船的描述变得不那么具有商业性。第三，他引用Tor Tor A.B. v.Alltrans Group of Canada Ltd.[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.123案中的Roskill勋爵的陈词。Adnrew Smith法官认为不应该解释剥夺第26条对船上船舶描述合约性的权利。Tor Line案例涉及在Baltime格式的租船合同中第13条的规定，只有在出租人或其管理人员缺乏恪尽职责或其个人行为，疏忽或违约引起出租人对货物的延误和损失以及货物损坏负责时，并特别关注合同第13条是否影响是为了限定关于船舶详细描述的义务。该租船合同第26条，包括“主甲板6.10米”的“自由高度”标题下的一项规定。Roskill勋爵，与他的贵族院的其他勋爵所同意，在第130页判决中所说：
In truth if cl. 13 were to be construed so as to allow a breach of the warranties as to description in cl. 26 to be committed or a failure to deliver the vessel at all to take place without financial redress to thecharterers, the charter virtually ceases to be a contract for the letting ofthe vessel and the performance of services by the owners, their master,officers and crew in consideration of the payment of time charter hire andbecomes no more than a statement of intent by the owners in return for which the charters are obliged to pay large sums by way of hire, though if the ownersfail to carry out their promises as to description or delivery, are entitled tonothing in lieu. I find it difficult to believe that this can accord with thetrue common intention of the parties and I do not think that this conclusioncan accord with the true construction of the charter in which the parties inthe present case are supposed to have expressed that true common intention in writing.
Adnrew Smith法官认为尽管承租人的代表律师提出了他的论点，但他并不同意。“序言”中提到的框分为四类。首先是那些（方框4和13），它们完成了在第26条中没有找到的细节。其次，还有一些（方框3和5）至少部分重复了第26条中给出的细节。第三，有六个方框，包括方框26，这些方框是通过参考合同第26条但不重复这些信息。最后，方框8根本没有完成，尽管相应的信息实际上在第26条中。Adnrew Smith法官认为提请注意这个原因有两个。首先，方框8留空的事实会破坏承租人代表律师的论点，即序言中提到的任何内容都应被当事方视为重要而不仅仅是一个细节：所提及的马力在序言中被认为不足以完成该框。其次，更重要的是，在完成这些框所需的信息在合同第26条中列出。在这两个案件中，双方并未将其作为参考。如果双方认为这些信息是有用的，那么在适当的方框中重复。
Adnrew Smith法官认为在他看来，对于方框12和其他方框中的条目“参见第26条”的更自然的解释是，各方正在向读者提及该条款，以了解租船合同方关于该方框内该主题。合同第26条的内容并未通过引用并入框中：这不是单词“see”的含义。当读者去看第26条时，他不仅发现了关于速度和油耗的细节，而且还发现了各方对关于条款状况的协议。
It seems to me that the morenatural interpretation of the entry "see cl. 26" in box 12 and other boxes is that the parties were referring the reader to the clause to find outwhat was said in the charter-party about the subject matter of the box. Thecontents of cl. 26 are not being incorporated by reference into the box: thatis not the meaning of the word "see". When the reader goes to cl. 26 he finds not only the details about speed and consumption but also the parties' agreement about the status of provisions in cl. 26.
这个观点可以稍微有所不同，即使框12将被视为合并第26条。只要是相关的，那么没有理由将其解读为包含相关的速度和油耗详情而没有合格的文字，如果作为解释资格确实适用于他们。如果起草人简单地将“第26条”并入，他就没有选择他所纳入条款的哪一部分。
Adnrew Smith法官认为因此有必要回到最后一段是否被解释为适用于相关速度和燃油规定的问题。他认为它是。在他看来，词语和权威的自然含义要求至少给出一些条款，即使不是全部条款，第26条不是合同条款。Adnrew Smith法官不能接受当事人打算在那里区分一些条款。其中26条仅作为“细节”处理，适用资格，以及其他规定超出细则范围，这些规定不适用。这种区别太模糊不清，不具有商业意义，强调认为的“details”在Adnrew Smith法官看来等于非自然地使用语言。
It is therefore necessary to return to the question whether thelast paragraph is to be interpreted as applying to the relevant speed and fuelprovisions. I consider that it is. It seems to me that both the natural meaningof the words and authority require that it be given the effect that at leastsome, if not all, of the provisions of cl. 26 are not contractual terms. Icannot accept that the parties intended there to be a distinction between someprovisions of cl. 26 which were to be treated as mere "details" andto which the qualification was to apply, and other provisions which were morethan details to which the provision was not to apply. The distinction is toovague to make commercial sense and puts an emphasis upon the"details" which in my view would amount to an unnatural use oflanguage.
Adnrew Smith法官认为无论是哪一个条款的最后一段的其他三种解释中的哪一种更受欢迎-这两种解释都是出租人代表律师的主要和次要来文以及他提到的第三种-这些限制适用于承租人所依赖的措辞。这对于出租人来说已经足够了。如果没有找到可让人接受的解释将资格只限制在第26条的一些条款中，Adnrew Smith法官认为必须被视为适用于所有其他项目规定，并且他认为可能会受理的两个更具限制性的解释不会从资格范围中删除相关细节。
Whichever is preferred of the other three interpretations of thelast paragraph of the clause which have been suggested - the two which were Mr.Smith's primary and secondary submissions and the third to which I havereferred - the qualification applies to the words upon which the charterersrely. That suffices for the owners. If no acceptable interpretation can be found which limits the qualification to only some of the provisions of cl. 26, it must be taken toapply to all, and the two more restrictive interpretations which in my viewcould possibly be entertained do not remove the relevant particulars from thescope of the qualification.
Adnrew Smith法官认为不是绝对有必要就三种解释中的哪一种更受欢迎发表意见。但是，在他看来，如他已经指出了第26条的最后一段。解释了对该段中关于该船舶的详细资料的效果，该资料由“about”一词限定。这种解释实现了该条款的最后一段，并给出了一个狭窄的效果，可以满足Roskill勋爵所表达的内容，并且他认为不能被认为是非商业性的。Adnrew Smith法官认为他知道，他应该谨慎解释该条款的最后一段，因为规定“about”具有非常规意义。然而，他的首选解释并不是他所希望的一个部分，即关于“about”这个词被剥夺了它对规定数字提供保证的通常含义。该段末尾的资格被解释为增加一个进一步的规定，即“about”的估计仅具有真诚陈述的地位。
基于所给出的理由，Adnrew Smith法官得出结论认为，就这一上诉提出的法律问题的答案是，租船合约方不包含关于船舶燃油消耗的保证。
It is therefore not strictly necessary for me to express a view asto which of the three interpretations is to be preferred. However, it seems tome for the reasons that I have already indicated the last paragraph of cl. 26explains the effect to be given to particulars about the vessel in theparagraph which are qualified by the word "about". Thisinterpretation gives effect to the last paragraph of the clause, and also givesit a narrow effect that meets the concerns expressed by Lord Roskill, andcannot, in my view, be said to be uncommercial. I am aware that I should becautious of interpreting the last paragraph of the clause as providing that"about" has been given a meaning which is not the ordinary meaning.However it is no part of my preferred interpretation that the word about isstripped of its usual meaning of affording a margin to the stipulated figures.The qualification at the end of the paragraph is to be interpreted as adding afurther stipulation, that the "about" estimations have the statusonly of bona fide representations.
I therefore conclude that answer to the point of law raised onthis appeal is that the charter-party does not contain a warranty about the vessel's rate of fuel consumption.
总结：
这几个先例，包括案中当事人的律师都一致认为，如果一方想借助WOG来免责的话，那么所做成的陈述，必须真诚，有合理的根据。如果不真诚没有合理根据而做出描述或陈述，那么该描述可能构成误述，陈述也可能称为虚假陈述，将得为违约承担责任。
对于WOG的解释问题，可以参《Time Charter》Chapter 3-The Ship，3.37，如下：
“Withoutguarantee”
3.37 Where an item of description is qualified by the words “without guarantee”, the owners give no contractual undertaking as to the matter described. The description is a representation only: see The Lipa [2001]2 Lloyd’s Rep. 17, per Andrew Smith, J., at page21. Nevertheless, the owners are bound by an implied promise that theirrepresentation is made in good faith, that is to say with a genuine belief inits accuracy: see The LendoudisEvangelos II [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 404. In that case the court was required to construe acharter for “duration about 70/80 days without guarantee”. Longmore, J., atpage 406, rejected the submission that where an estimate was given “withoutguarantee”, the charterers impliedly undertook that the estimate was based on reasonable grounds.
此外，根据“谁主张谁举证”的民事举证责任分担规则，如果出租人主张承租人违反合同义务，如本文所列举的第二个和第三个案例，出租人必须首先证明承租人在签订合同的时候对租期作出估计时不是真诚的，存在恶意。相反，如第一个和第四个案例，承租人必须得举证出租人的签订合同的时候对船舶规范所作出的陈述不是真诚的，存在恶意。但是这种举证责任，相当困难，另一方几乎就不可能证明确实存在这种恶意。
回到本文开头部分，笔者为什么认为那个争议案中，出租人仍得承担船舶错过Laycan所带来的责任，第一，承租人为了使船舶能符合承租人的货载laycan的需求，给出的船舶动态的陈述并不真诚，或者说存在恶意。第二，出租人未考虑到船本身的状况，而且未考虑到横跨印度洋大西洋，过好望角途中将遭遇的恶劣天气的影响，所给出的ETA，完全没有合理的根据。因此WOG这一措辞不足以保护出租人，出租人得为违约行为负责。
这方面的内容，可以参《TimeCharter》Chapter 7-Delivery
7.6 However,the clause also has another effect: it imposes on the owners an implied obligation to exercisereasonable diligence to deliver the ship by the relevant date.
同时，该解约条款，也默示了一责任到出租人身上，那就是如果出租人未
尽恪尽职责去交付船舶的话，出租人得为损害赔偿负责。可以参《Time Charter》Chapter 24-Cancelling Clauses,如下：
24.3 However, a cancelling clause does give rise to an implied obligation on the owners forbreach of which they may be liable in damages to exercise due diligence totender the ship for delivery by the cancelling date.
另外，一个条款规定销约日期，其包含出租人预期在该日期之前准备就绪可以装载的声明，这反过来又产生了一种隐含的保证，即该预期是诚实的，并且有合理的根据。
7.7 In addition, it is thought a clause specifying a cancellingdate contains an implicit statement by the owners that the ship is expected tobe ready to load by that date, which in turn gives rise to an implied warranty that that expectation is honest and based on reasonable grounds.
但在之前文章，笔者多次说明，与本文开头所提到的争议作出了相反的观点。涉及的是装卸工所造成的船吊损坏争议，租船确认书中关于船舶规范描述如下：
MV XXX ,
8,081/2,717,LOA/BM114.62M/19.6M,GR/BL18,082/16,125CBM , 2HO/HA ,HATCH SIZE NO.1 20.3MX 14.8M ,
NO.2 33.6M X14.8M, DERRICK 1 X 25MT , 2CRANES X 30MT(COMBINE 55MT) ADA
AT SEA (LADEN): ABT12.5KT@ABT11.4MT (IFO 180 CST) +ABT1.0MT (MGO)/DAY
IN PORT IDLE: ABT 0.2MT IFO AND ABT1.0MT MGO/DAY
WRKG/DEBALLAST/BALLAST: ABT 2.0MT( MGO)/DAY
ADA WOG
出租人在描述中，对于船吊的部分加了备注ADA，在最后感觉仍不足够，又加了ADA WOG等措辞。那么对此的合理解释，将如The “Lipa”案一样，这里的ADA, ADA WOG，对于非专业律师水平的租约起草则而言，这并非是多余的。因此最后的ADA WOG适用于该条款下所有的船舶描述，只要所给出的描述是真诚的。笔者坚定地认为，船吊损坏的争议案件中，出租人对所给出的数据完全是基因真诚的，因此可以依赖WOG来免责。首先，船是新买的二手船，对于船舶的实际情况，船吊实际的安全负荷，需要在经营中再次确认，因此对于原船东给出的数据，出租人加了ADA和WOG，是处于真诚的；其次，作为一商业人士，添加这类不保证的措辞，完全有商业的现实意义。而作为未按合同要求，未安排胜任的装卸工人，提供了超过船吊安全负荷的货物的承租人而言，明显的是商务意识不足，签订了对承租人而言非常不利的合同。但是如Sumption勋爵所说，商业合同本身没有公平性而言，甚至还可能是最不公平的，如果当事方能够接受。笔者因此认为，船吊损坏案件中的承租人，必须得为自己的错误买单，或者交学费。
也许有人会疑问，假如合同规定船吊描述的安全负荷为30吨，但实际只能起吊25吨，这种情况是否构成误述的问题。笔者认为，如果合同中已经明确加了WOG，那么并不构成误述。WOG，不保证，这措辞足够清晰明确，任何合理的商业人士都不可能会有歧义。既然都不保证了，那么就不存在是否误述的问题，除非能去证明出租人所给出的描述是恶意的。
当然，笔者毫不怀疑，在合同的其它条款作出了相反规定的情况下，比如承租人明确说本航次需要用船吊起吊30吨做的货物，出租人必须保证船吊能起吊此货物。那么如果出租人在这种情况下，仍然选择签订合同，那么纵然在船舶描述中加入了WOG，仍不足以保护出租人。如果事后证明，船吊无法起吊承租人提供的30吨的货物，出租人将有权利索赔损害赔偿，如The “TFL Propserity”案。
因此，在英国法下，如果一旦在租约中，尤其是涉及船舶描述，航速油耗，租期等方面并入了WOG的措辞，如果合同中没有其他相反的条款规定，只要一方在提供这些信息时是真诚的，有合理的根据，那么将无需承担合约责任。事后，另一方想去举证其在提供这些信息时存在恶意，将非常困难。
(修改于2018年5月14日晚，本篇图片由徒弟供应，82年出版的杨老的系列丛书，可见比笔者还爱好海商法。)
海运圈聚焦专栏作者 Alex （微信公众号 航运佬）
