2016-10-21
4988 
买卖经纪人的法律地位
Sale and purchase brokers (“S&P” brokers as they are widely known) are independent contractors who act as agents for principals in connection with the sale and purchase of ships. The S&P broker's job is to first match seller and buyer, and then help them develop, document and complete the sale and purchase transaction.
买卖经纪人（因为他们是广为人知船舶买卖经纪人，缩写为‘S&P’经纪人)是独立的合同承包人并作为船舶出售和购买相关联的委托人的代理人。买卖经纪人的工作是首先是相互匹配协调买卖双方，然后是帮助他们推进关系、提供文书记录和完成买卖交易。
The buyer and the seller may each appoint their own brokers. Alternatively, it is possible (although potentially difficult) for an S&P broker to act as a sole intermediary between seller and buyer.
买卖双方可以各自指定他们自己的经纪人。 另外，这有可能(尽管可能很困难)一个买卖经纪人作为卖方与买方之间唯一的中间人。
Issues regarding the appointment, authority and duties of S&P brokers will usually be governed by the general law of agency; only rarely will a broker not be acting as an agent of his principal.
关于买卖经纪人的任命、授权和职责的问题，通常是会受一般的代理法律的管辖；只有很少的情况经纪人不是作为其委托人的代理人。
经纪人的任命/指定
In many cases, a broker will be expressly appointed by his principal. Such appointments may be made by means of written agreements (sometimes called “brokerage agreements” or “agency agreements” or “retainer agreements”), or by means of emailed instructions, or by word of mouth (in face-to-face meetings or by telephone), or by a combination of any of these methods.
在许多情况下，经纪人是由他的委托人明确指定的。这种的任命可能通过书面协议的方式（有时称为‘经纪协议’或‘代理协议’或‘劳务聘用协议’），或通过电子邮件的指示，或通过口头表达(在‘面对面’的会谈或者电话)，或这些方法的任何组合形式。
However, it is possible for an S&P broker's appointment to arise by other means. For example, if a broker holds himself out as agent of, say, the buyer of a ship in circumstances where the broker has not been duly authorised by his supposed principal, the buyer could ratify the steps purportedly taken on its behalf by the broker with the result that the broker could be retrospectively clothed with the necessary authority.
然而，通过其他方法，也可能会出现买卖经纪人的任命问题。例如，如果一名经纪人一直是保持船舶买方的代理人身份，在该经纪人还没有被他的预期委托人正式授权的情况下，买方可能后来认可该经纪人所采取的措施是代表他的行为，则结果是，该经纪人可能会被追溯性地赋予必要的授权。
When a broker is appointed in writing, the brokerage agreement should cover key commercial and legal matters concerning his appointment such as: the nature and extent of the broker's instructions and authority; the broker's entitlement to commission; and any liability exclusions and the law which is to govern the principal/broker relationship – this last point may be of particular importance where (as is often the case) the principal is in one country and the broker is in another.
当经纪人的任命是以书面的形式任命时，经纪协议应该包含下列一些关键商业上和法律上的事项：(1). 赋予经纪人的指示和授权的性质和范围； (2). 给予经纪人佣金的权利； (3). 任何责任除外和管辖委托人/经纪人关系的法律——当委托人在一个国家，而经纪人在另一个国家，(通常是这样)，这最后一点可能显得尤为重要。
合理小心的一般性义务
A broker will owe his principal a general duty to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in the performance of business which his principal entrusts to him. The principal will be entitled to expect that his broker will seek to carry out the principal's instructions so far as reasonably possible, conduct negotiations in a prompt, orderly and professional manner, and pay correct attention to the details of the transaction under consideration.
经纪人向他的委托人负责的一般性义务是运用合理的技能，行使合理的小心与谨慎之职以履行他的委托人委托的商业事务。委托人将有权预期他的经纪人会试图尽可能合理地执行其委托人的指示，及时、有序和专业性的态度进行谈判，以及真正去留心注意谈判中的交易细节。
Where there is a brokerage agreement or other contract between the broker and his principal, the broker will also owe his principal a concurrent contractual duty to take care, which is implied by law into every contract for services. Usually the content of the contractual duty to take care will be the same as the general duty and the measure of damages will be identical as well. But there may be other differences (e.g. in relation to limitation of liability), of which an aggrieved principal can take advantage.
当经纪人和他的委托人之间存在经纪协议或其他合同时，经纪人也同时向其委托人负责共存的小心谨慎的合同义务，这是法律在每一个服务合同所默示的义务。 通常，小心谨慎的合同义务的内容等同于一般性的义务，其损害赔偿的标准也相同。但，这可能还有其他一些差异（例如，有关责任限制方面），权益受到侵害的委托人可以加以利用。
The same standards will apply whether a broker is working on a sale and purchase transaction or giving a ship valuation to sellers, buyers, bankers or investors; brokers often supply market data and valuations in prospectus documents used in connection with stock market listing arrangements and bond or share issues. A valuation is an expression of opinion and a broker will not necessarily be liable to those relying upon his valuation merely because it turns out that the valuation was inaccurate: the question will be whether the broker exercised reasonable skill, care and diligence when compiling his valuation.
相同的标准也将适用于：经纪人是否在买卖交易继续从事工作，或为卖方、买方，银行或投资人提供船舶评估；经纪人经常会像在招股企划书中一样提供船舶市场数据和船价的估值，这种文件的使用一般是与股票市场有关，其中会详细列出公司的安排和债券或股票的议题。估值是一种意见的表达形式，经纪人不一定会对依赖他估值而行事的人负责，仅仅因为后来证明估值是不准确而负有责任：问题在于经纪人搜集资料进行估值时，他是否运用合理的技能，行使合理的小心与谨慎之职。
If a broker falls short of these standards, he may be liable in damages to his principal and, possibly, to others. In recent years there have been several unreported cases of brokers being pursued by banks, bondholders and other professional investors in connection with ship valuations. Sale and purchase valuation work is a high risk activity and seemingly innocuous mistakes may have potentially huge financial consequences. Brokers will never be able to operate in a zero-risk environment, and no amount of training and supervision will prevent honest and competent professionals from making mistakes if the time and other pressures bearing upon them are severe enough. But S&P brokers can address the risks which come with their job by writing commercially acceptable and legally enforceable exclusions and limitations of liability into their terms of appointment whenever it is possible for them to do so (and it ought to be possible in relation to formal valuation exercises for banks and professional investors) and by arranging appropriate legal liability insurance cover.
如果经纪人达不到这些标准的要求，他就可能承担对其委托人或其他人的造成的损害赔偿。 近些年来，有好几个未报导的案件是关于船舶评估方面，经纪人被银行、债券持有人和其它专业投资人起诉。船舶买卖评估工作是高风险的业务，看似不起眼的错误有可能会产生巨大的潜在经济后果。经纪人永远不可能在零风险环境中进行活动，如果他们承受的时间和其它压力足够严重，再多的培训和监督也防止不了诚实和称职的专业人员犯错误。 但，无论何时，买卖经纪人都可以通过商业上可接受的与法律上可执行的除外免责与责任限制的书面条款（为银行和专业投资人进行正式评估的情况，也可以这样做），以及通过安排适当的法律责任保险保障，来解决和规避工作范围中的风险。
Some S&P brokers (sensing there may be greater safety in numbers) issue valuations through panels formed by several broking houses, the perceived benefit being that the collective approach should reduce the chances of bad valuations and that claims risks are shared.
一些买卖经纪人（在数量上，可能感觉会更安全一些）会通过几家经纪公司组成联合工作组共同发布评估报告，所想到的好处是，集体的行为应该可以减少估值失误的几率并分摊索赔风险。
咨询的义务或仅提供信息的义务？
In Banque Bruxelles Lambert v. Eagle Star Insurance (1996), on appeal to the House of Lords, the House of Lords laid down principles which are important for brokers, valuers and other professionals who owe a duty to take care in providing information and advice. The key passage in the judgment of Lord Hoffmann reads as follows:
在Banque Bruxelles Lambert v. Eagle Star Insurance (1996)案， 上诉到上议院， 上议院规定了对经纪人、评估师和其它专业人士重要的一些准则：在提供信息和咨询服务时，承担小心谨慎的义务。在Hoffmann勋爵的判决词中，关键的一段论述如下：
“ … a person under a duty to take reasonable care to provide information on which someone else will decide upon a course action is, if negligent, not generally regarded as responsible for all the consequences of that course of action. He is responsible only for the consequences of the information being wrong. A duty of care which imposes … responsibility for losses which would have occurred even if the information [given] had been correct is not in my view fair and reasonable as between the parties…. The principle thus stated distinguishes between the duty to provide information for the purpose of enabling someone else to decide upon a course of action and a duty to advise someone as to what course of action he should take. If the duty is to advise whether or not a course of action should be taken, the adviser must take reasonable care to consider all the potential consequences of that course of action. If he is negligent, he will therefore be responsible for all the foreseeable loss which is a consequence of that course of action having been taken. If his duty is only to supply information, he must take reasonable care to ensure that the information is correct and, if he is negligent, will be responsible for all the foreseeable consequences of the information being wrong.”
‘……一个人负有合理小心谨慎的义务提供信息服务，其他人就会根据此信息决定如何进行一系列的行动，如果有疏忽的话，一般是不认为会对上述行动过程中造成的所有一切后果承担责任。他仅负责错误信息导致的后果。小心谨慎的义务将迫使……其承担本会发生的损失的责任，即使 [提供的] 信息是正确的，对于当事双方来说，我不认为这是公平合理的……因此，所规定的原则应对提供信息的义务与建议咨询的义务加以区分，提供信息的义务是接受者自己决定如何行动，而提供建议咨询的义务是建议人们如何采取行动。如果是提供建议咨询的义务，是否应当采取如此行动，提供咨询者必须小心谨慎去考虑这些行为活动导致的所有潜在的后果。如果他疏忽大意，他会因此承担由于采取这些行为活动引起的后果而导致的所有可预见的损失的责任。如果他的义务仅是提供信息（但不涉及建议行动），他必须行使合理小心之职，以确保信息的正确性，因而，如果他疏忽大意，将承担错误信息导致的所有可预见的后果的责任。
So, a broker or valuer who negligently provides incorrect information in connection with a transaction bears the risk of the loss flowing from that information proving to be incorrect. On the other hand, a broker who advises on the transaction itself, and is negligent in doing so, bears the risk of all loss flowing from the transaction. The case principles referred to above will therefore be relevant in the assessment of damages for breach of the duty of care on the part of S&P brokers and valuers.
因此，经纪人或评估师疏忽地提供了与交易有关的不正确的信息，将要承担因这些被证实是不正确的信息而引起的损失的风险。另一方面，经纪人为该交易本身提供意见咨询，并且存在疏忽的话，将承担交易引起的所有损失的风险。因此，上文的案例原则，将作为相关的参考以评估买卖经纪人和评估师违反小心谨慎的义务所导致的损害赔偿。
Subsequent court decisions suggest that the courts may find it difficult to decide whether the broker's duty was to advise on the transaction itself or to provide information on the basis of which others were to decide how to act. There is a risk that the courts may be too quick to equate close involvement in a transaction with a duty to advise on the transaction. As noted at section 2.1.3 above, S&P brokers and valuers would therefore be well advised to clearly define the precise nature and extent of their responsibilities in each transaction, and also to try to limit both the scope of their duty and the extent of their liability for breach of the duty of care whenever such exclusions and limitations are commercially and legally achievable.
后来的法院判决表明，法院可能会发现，这很难判定经纪人的义务是否为交易本身提供咨询，或者依据交易提供信息由其他人自己判断如何行事。 这里的一个风险是，法院可能会太快认定，将密切参与到交易之中的活动就等同于为交易提供咨询的义务。正如上文第2.1.3节所述的，因此，在每个交易中，明确忠告买卖经纪人和评估师界定他们责任的确切范围和性质，同时，也要试图限制他们的义务范围，和因违反小心谨慎的义务而承担的责任限度，无论何时这些除外免责和责任限制在商业上和法律上是可以实现的。
信托的义务
In addition to the general duty of care which an S&P broker will owe to his principal at law and (where applicable) in contract, usually the ordinary course of business circumstances in which a broker acts for his principal will give rise to what is known as a fiduciary relationship which will involve the broker owing his principal a heightened form of duty of care or fiduciary duty.
除了一般小心谨慎义务之外，买卖经纪人将向其委托人承担法律上和（如适用）合同上的责任，通常，在商业环境的正常来往过程中，经纪人是代表委托人的行为，这就产生了所谓的信托关系，这种关系将包含经纪人向他的委托人承担更高形式的小心谨慎的义务或者信托义务。
A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The key duty of a fiduciary is the duty of loyalty – a principal is entitled to the undivided loyalty of his fiduciary. The precise nature and extent of a fiduciary's obligations to his principal will be determined by the particular circumstances of the individual relationship and the terms of any underlying contract. But in the ordinary course the principal fiduciary duties of an S&P broker may be summarised as follows: he must act in good faith and in the best interests of his principal; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty to his principal and his own interests may conflict; and he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal.
受托人是指：某人承诺代表另一个的行为去处理某些特定事项，这种背景下，他们之间就产生信任和信赖的关系。受托人的主要职责是忠诚义务——委托人有权获得他的受托人的全心全意的忠诚度。受托人向他的委托人负有的义务的确切性质和范围，将由个人关系的特殊情况和任何主合同的条款来确定。但在一般情况下，买卖经纪人主要的信托义务可以概括如下： (1). 他必须真诚善意和为他的委托人的最佳利益而行事； (2). 他肯定不能从对他的信任中获利；(3). 他不能把自己置身于一个向他的委托人负有的义务与他自己的利益相冲突的位置。(4). 没有经过他的委托人的知情同意，他不可能为自己的利益或第三人的利益而采取行动。
An example of a breach of fiduciary duty would be where one party to a contract secretly makes a payment to the broker of the other party or secretly confers some other benefit on that broker. Such a payment or benefit (often referred to as a secret commission) would be a breach of the broker's fiduciary duty unless it is validated by actual disclosure to the broker's principal and by the principal's fully informed consent. If it is established that the payment has been made – or the benefit has been conferred in secret – the motive will be irrelevant since the mere fact of the payment or benefit will be sufficient to create a potential conflict of interest between the broker's fiduciary duty to his principal and the broker's own interests.
违反信托义务的一个例子是，其中合同一方当事人偷偷地付款给对方的经纪人或暗中授予该代理人其他一些的好处。这样支付的款项或输送的利益（通常被称为一个秘密佣金）是一个违反经纪人的信托义务，除非是实际披露给经纪人的委托人 和委托人完全知情同意 并批准认可。如果已经确定是支付了金钱—— 或秘密输送了好处——与其动机不再有关 ，因为金钱或好处这一事实就足以导致经纪人向他的委托人负有的信托义务和经纪人自身的利益之间的潜在冲突。
Where a broker accepts a secret payment or other benefit, his principal will be entitled instantly to terminate the broker's appointment and the broker will forfeit his right to any commission. The principal will also be entitled to treat the entire business transaction as a nullity (i.e. of no legal effect) and to set it aside. The broker and the party making or conferring the secret payment or benefit may be exposed to a range of civil liabilities and sanctions (including liabilities to account for the payment or benefit and to pay compensatory damages), and they may also be subject to criminal sanctions (see section 2.1.7 below).
当经纪人接受秘密金钱或其他好处，其委托人都将有权立即终止代理的任命和经纪人将被剥夺享有任何佣金的权利。委托人也有权视整个商业交易无效（即无法律效力）并把它废除。该经纪人和金钱支付方或利益输送方有可能承担一系列的民事法律责任和遭受制裁（包括因金钱或利益引起的责任，以及补偿损害赔偿的责任），他们也可能会遭受到刑事的制裁（参看下文第2.1.7节）。
海运圈聚焦专栏作者 魏长庚船长（微信号CaptWei）。
